The Mess We’re In – Trillions of Dollars of Missing GDP

According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) the U.S. has a cumulative output gap of $2.8 trillion so far since the recession began.  That’s trillion with a TR, as in a million millions.  This is the core problem in the U.S. today and for the next couple years.  The recession saw the economy shrink and we simply haven’t aren’t getting back to where we were, let alone to where we could be.

Two of the most basic concepts in economics are the idea of opportunity costs and the technique of the counter-factual.   Both play a part in this analysis.  First, opportunity cost is the idea of the real cost of something or some choice isn’t the money expended but rather what you could have done but didn’t/can’t because of your choice.  Analyzing opportunity costs involves using the other idea, the technique of the counterfactual.  A counterfactual is a hypothetical outcome that could have been or even would have been, but didn’t happen because of the choices made.  People use counterfactuals often, they just don’t call them such.  For example, if you imagine decide not to go to a party and you choose to stay home one night, you might imagine what would have happened if you had indeed gone to the party.  That’s a counterfactual.  It could be good and attractive (you would have had fun at the party and met someone very interesting) or it good be negative (you would have gotten drunk, tried to drive home, and got arrested for DUI).  Comparing actual events to counterfactuals is integral to economic analysis.

In the case of macroeconomics, we often use a counterfactual called “potential GDP”.  Potential real GDP is the amount of real GDP that would have been produced IF we had made policy choices that produced full-employment.  In practice potential real GDP is often estimated by a combination of extending the long-run trend line of GDP from previous decades and of calculating output per worker and multiplying times the number of potential workers.  In this case, the additional workers include not only those presently recorded as “unemployed” but also those workers or part of the population that used to work but are no longer working or classified as unemployed.  It’s a fairly involved statistical undertaking, but fortunately we have the CBO to do the heavy lifting for us.  The numbers and graphs are accessible via the wonderful FRED database at the St.Louis Federal Reserve bank.  The data series is called GDPPOT.

The CBO released it’s latest long-run estimates for GDP.  Here’s a graph comparing potential real GDP to actual Real GDP. It shows actual numbers for 2008- first half of 2011.  From then on it’s the CBO’s best estimates of future actual real GDP given present government policies.

Yeah, that’s an ugly gap between those two lines.  That’s the opportunity cost of lost potential.  We could have been $2.8 trillion dollars better off over the last 3 years (cumulative, not annual). We could have had tens of millions more working. But we didn’t.  More disturbing is that we will continue to underperform for many years.  The CBO doesn’t project getting back to full-employment and our achieving our potential output until the end of 2015 – four years from now.

But now here’s the catch.  The CBO estimates and analysis don’t offer any rationale or reason why they suddenly forecast a recovery in 2015.  Basically they are saying that surely something will happen in 2015 to bring recovery, but they can’t point to any policies or dynamics that will cause such a recovery.

My own sense is that this will take a lot longer to recover given the government’s current focus on debt, deficits, and cutting spending.  It’s the wrong policy mix to achieve full employment given this kind of output gap.  We will eventually get back to full employment – if nothing else, sooner or later people die off and equipment rusts away.  But we’re in the middle of an ongoing depression and current policies won’t change that.  (note I said depression, not a “Great depression”)

 

Hurricanes, Disasters, and GDP

Ok, normally I’m writing about the disastrous effects of changes in GDP.  Today, though, I’m going to write about the effects of disasters on GDP. As I write this, it’s mid-day on Saturday, Aug 27.  Hurricane Irene has just hammered North Carolina and the Outer Banks. Irene is continuing in both it’s push up the Eastern seaboard toward New York City.  I have no idea at this moment how bad the damage will be.  What’s clear is that even if the storm weakens to a tropical storm strength, it will bring extensive flooding and wind damage across a very heavily populated area.

Major natural disasters generally do not have a major long-run effect on the economy and GDP.  This is largely because the U.S. is a really large nation and even the most severe natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina only directly affect a small portion of the country.  So even if a hurricane or earthquake were to stop 40% of the economic activity in a region, as long as the region is only say 2-5% of the nation, the net effect is a short, temporary “blip” on the nation’s GDP.  Hurricane Irene could conceivably be different because the projected path includes over an estimated 65 million Americans – nearly 20% of the nation.

Asking what the effect of a natural disaster will be on GDP is probably the wrong question to ask.  What we’re really interested in is “what is the effect of the natural disaster on the economy and our living standards?”   It’s just that we are so accustomed to using GDP as a proxy measure for the size of the economy and our living standards.  Unfortunately, GDP as a measure of the economy and our welfare has some weaknesses.  These weaknesses are really important in the case of a natural disaster and interpreting it’s effects.  GDP measures economic production by counting the dollar value of all transactions where something new is produced and sold.  GDP doesn’t measure the value of what we own – our wealth. GDP doesn’t measure the value of services produced that aren’t sold (like charitable acts, household production, etc).  GDP doesn’t measure our capability to produce.  It only measures what we actually produce and sell.

The economic effects of a natural disaster are to change exactly these things that GDP does not measure. The primary economic effect of a major disaster such as an earthquake, hurricane, extensive flooding, or  a swath of destructive tornadoes is to destroy wealth and destroy our capacity to produce.  In macroeconomic terms, a natural disaster is a sudden reduction in our resources: capital equipment, buildings, and available labor. None of this is a good thing.  It reduces our ability to produce goods and services in the future and it reduces our welfare right now.  But that effect won’t show up in GDP measures.

What will show up in GDP measures after the natural disaster is a perverse reaction in the months after the disaster.  This comes because of the re-building activity that comes after the disaster.  Repairing buildings, cleaning up, rebuilding all require paid services, building supplies, labor, etc.  These transactions will show up in GDP measures in the months/quarters after the disaster as an slight increase in total GDP.  But it’s a deceptive increase in total GDP because we aren’t really significantly better off.  We’re just getting back to the condition before the disaster.  GDP counts the fixing, but not the damage done.  This is why we sometimes here commentators say that a “disaster is good for the economy”.  It isn’t really.  It’s good for GDP, but that’s not a perfect measure of the economy.  The mistaken idea that damage or disasters are good for the economy is what economists call the Fallacy of the Broken Window. It was first explained by Frederic Bastiat.

Normally the economic impact a natural disaster will be relatively short-lived so long as there is a mechanism to finance reconstruction and the real resources in the larger nation to do it.  Typically in a developed nation like the U.S., the financing for reconstruction comes from insurance company payouts and government, especially national government, loans and payments. In particular it is the responsibility of the national government to help rapidly restore infrastructure.  If adequate financing and national resources exist, then we rarely find a national impact on GDP or the economy lasting beyond perhaps a 6 months to a year.  The smaller the economy, the greater the potential for longer lasting damage and even a failure to rebuild at all.   That’s the problem in New Orleans five years after Katrina.  The city is now permanently smaller since large numbers of people chose not to return and rebuild.  At the U.S. level, though, it’s insignificant.

The lack of financing and resources can severely damage a very small or poor nation for a very long time.  That’s why Haiti, a small and poor nation, is so dependent upon outside help to rebuild. The other exception that can result in lasting damage and reduction of the economy is when the disaster brings permanent physical damage that cannot be repaired or rebuilt easily.  The nuclear disasters in Chernobyl and possibly Fukishima fall into this category.

So overall, a natural disaster is not likely to be a long-term significant

 

GDP for 2nd Quarter Revised Downward

As is normal practice, the BEA released the second estimate of 2nd quarter GDP growth.  GDP growth was definitely even slower in 2nd quarter than previously reported.  CalculatedRiskBlog tells us:

From the BEA: Gross Domestic Product, Second Quarter 2011 (second estimate

Real gross domestic product — the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States — increased at an annual rate of 1.0 percent in the second quarter of 2011, (that is, from the first quarter to the second quarter), according to the “second” estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

This was revised down from 1.3% and slightly below the consensus of 1.1%.

Exports subtracted more from GDP - as did changes in private inventories. Consumption of services and fixed investment were revised up slightly.

The following graph shows the quarterly GDP growth (at an annual rate) for the last 30 years. The current quarter is in blue.

GDP Growth RateClick on graph for larger image in graph gallery.

The dashed line is the current growth rate. Growth in Q2 at 1.0% annualized was below trend growth (around 3%) – and very weak for a recovery, especially with all the slack in the system.

Calculated Risk goes on to report on the breakdown of what sectors accounted for what part of the growth (or absence of growth).  The two most significant negatives were Personal Consumption of Goods and State/Local Government Spending.  Both contracted sharply and each had the effect of lowering the GDP growth rate by 0.34 points.  A 1.0% annualized growth rate is really not good at all.  It’s horrible in fact.  And that means it’s not the time to be cutting state and local government spending.  The federal government really could do something but there’s no political will in Washington.

Not Retiring Is the New Retirement Plan For Many

CalculatedRiskBlog tells us about a new major study of American workers and their retirement plans.  The study is published by the Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies [note for students: the center is an excellent source of research data and analysis].  CalculatedRisks summarizes:

From Rachel Ensign at the WSJ: For Many Seniors, There May Be No Retirement

Already battered nest eggs took another beating this month with the market’s wild swings. With interest rates essentially at zero since 2008, income from Treasurys and certificates of deposit is pretty paltry. … On top of that, housing prices [leave] homeowners with much less equity to tap.

Here is the survey mentioned in the article: The New Retirement: Working

• The survey found that for many Americans, the foundation of their retirement strategy is simply not to retire, to work considerably longer than the traditionalretirement age, or work in retirement:
–39 percent of workers plan to work past age 70 or do not plan to retire
–54 percent of workers expect to plan to continue working when they retire
–40 percent now expect to work longer and retire at an older age since the recession

• Workers’ greatest fears about retirement include “outliving my savings and investments” and “not being able to meet the financial needs of my family.”

• Most workers will continue working out of financial necessity:
–Workers estimate their retirement savings needs at $600,000 (median), but in comparison, fewer than one-third (30 percent) have currently saved more than $100,000 in all household retirement accounts
–Most workers, regardless of age or household income, agree that they could work until age 65 and still not have enough money saved to meet their retirement needs
–Of those who plan on working past the traditional retirement age of 65, the most commonly cited reasons are of need versus choice
–Many workers (31 percent) anticipate that they will need to provide financial support to family members

When I looked at the report myself, I was struck by this line in the executive summary:

Workers’ greatest fears about retirement include “outliving my savings and investments” and “not being able to meet the financial needs of my family.”

This is related to the point I’ve tried to make in the past (and also here  and here):  Social Security is not a pension plan. Social Security is an insurance program that insures all of us against the possibility of “outliving our savings and investments”.  It is particularly disturbing to hear politicians and those least likely to outlive their investments be in such a hurry to cut Social Security (or Medicare) at a time when uncertainty about investments and savings is rising (just look at the uncertain stock market and housing markets)!

President Obama’s Jobs Advisor Ships Jobs Overseas.

No wonder jobs aren’t being created.  The President listens closely to Jeffrey Immelt, the CEO of corporate welfare recipient large multinational General Electric about jobs policy.  So what’s GE doing about jobs?  Bloomberg reports:

General Electric Co.’s health-care unit, the world’s biggest maker of medical-imaging machines, is moving the headquarters of its 115-year-old X-ray business to Beijing to tap growth in China.

“A handful” of top managers will move to the Chinese capital and there won’t be any job cuts, Anne LeGrand, vice president and general manager of X-ray for GE Healthcare, said in an interview. The headquarters will move from Waukesha, Wisconsin, amid a broader parent-company plan to invest about $2 billion across China, including opening six “customer innovation” and development centers.

The move follows the introduction earlier this year of GE Healthcare’s “Spring Wind” initiative to develop and distribute medical products and services in China, GE said in a statement today. More than 20 percent of the X-ray unit’s new products will be developed in China, LeGrand said.

Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-25/ge-healthcare-moves-x-ray-base-to-china-no-job-cuts-planned.html#ixzz1UjwUi6Yu

Income Distribution Does Matter. It’s Wrong Now and Stopping Growth.

When people think about “income distribution” there’s a tendency to think of it only in terms of what different people or households have available to spend.  In other words, we focus on the fairness or equity of whether some households should only have a small amount of money to live off of vs. others who get a large amount of money to live off of.  The debates then often deteriorate into whether or not the households put forth effort (“worked”) for their income and therefore “earned” it.

But there’s more to the issue of income distribution.  A household’s income is not just determined by how much “effort” it’s willing to make or how much “investment” it’s made in the past.  So a household’s income isn’t just how much you work and what education/qualifications you have.  The general level of wages matters too.  And that’s determined at the macro level by institutional arrangements in society.

The nature of production is that it requires both capital and labor.  The joint product is then sold.  This is called productivity.  Part of the income distribution question is “how is the value from joint productivity split up between payments to capital and payments to workers”.

In the U.S. during the Golden Era, the period of World War II until the mid-1970′s, the social contract and institutional arrangements were that the benefits of increased productivity were split evenly between both capital and labor.  Both benefitted.  Starting around 1980 that deal was cancelled.  The social contract has increasingly moved to all gains from improved productivity going to capital and none to labor.  As a result, labor’s share of national income has consistently declined.  The Great Recession was a major blow.  It’s this change in the social contract that is the root source of the frustration and pain felt by so many households.

Garth Brazelton at Economics Revival explains why this matters now.  He explains why we are still in a recession, or at least why the 90% or so of us that work for  a living as opposed to living off of interest and profits are still in recession:

Who cares about double-dip. We never left. Why? because you can’t get out of a recession without consumers/labor income growth. While productivity has grown over the last few years, labor’s share of national income continues to plummet. This implies that others (capitalists / profit-makers) are ‘out of their recession’ but consumers and laborers are not.

The BLS has a nice publication here.

Ordinarily a low cyclical labor share isn’t necessarily a problem because firms can use profits to invest in new business ventures a eventually lower the unemployment rate and provide more compensation in a recovery. The problem here of course is that firms are too busy paying off past debts from poor decisions made a decade ago, or two skittish to do anything substantial with their profits at the moment. So that, in combination with the low labor share of income is like a double-whammy for consumers and laborers who see the haves continue to have and the have-nots continuing to have nothing.

It’s the Political Economy That Must Change.

Peter Dorman at Econospeak has an excellent post on the real challenges facing the U.S. today.  It’s the political economy that must change.  It no longer serves the interests of the vast majority of Americans. We need more discussion and action at these levels>

It’s the Political Economy, Stupid!, by Peter Dorman: Sometimes living in the world of ideas makes it harder to understand the real one. If you happen to be an economist, and the time is now, that is true in spades. Take Paul Krugman, for instance. After bemoaning the terrible policy choices of the last two years, he writes, “I’m still trying to make sense of this global intellectual failure.” It’s as if the core problem is that political leaders didn’t learn their macroeconomics well enough.

But Keynes was wrong about the power of “academic scribblers”. Idea-smiths provide language, narratives and tools for those in control, but the broad contours of policy depend on who the controllers happen to be. We are not living through an epoch of intellectual failure, but one in which there is no available mechanism to oust a political-economic elite whose interests have become incompatible with ours.

This is not some sudden development, much less a coup d’etat as is sometimes claimed. No, the accretion of power by the rentiers has been systematic, structural and the outcome of a decades-long process. It is deeply rooted in modern capitalist economies due to the transformation of corporations into tradable, recombinant portfolios of assets, increasing concentration of and returns to ownership, and the failure of regulation to keep pace with technology and transnational scale. Those who sit at the pinnacle of wealth for the most part no longer think about production, nor do they worry very much about who the ultimate consumers will be; they take financial positions and demand policies that will see to it that these positions are profitable.

The rapid and robust global restoration of profits post-2008 was not an accident. Public funds were used to bail out exposed creditors and shore up asset values, while the crisis was used to suppress wages and postpone meaningful regulatory reform. Indeed, I can predict with some confidence that many of the profits, particularly in the financial sector, that have been reported in official filings and blessed by the accounting firms will later be found to be illusory—but not before those who have claims on the revenues have cashed in to their own personal advantage. The institutions will be decimated, but those who owned, lent to or bet on them will be rich. This is not a failure, at least not for them.

You could make a case that, collectively, the interests of the financially endowed ultimately require a rescue of the real, nonfinancial global economy. Surely, when we take our painful plunge into the second dip of the Great Recession, their wealth will be at risk. But the ability to see it at a system level presupposes either a system-level organization of the class or the existence of individual interests that are transparently systemic. Neither appears to be the case today. From what we (you and me) can see from our vantage point, the ruling demands are to make sure my bonds are serviced, my counterparties pony up, the markets I invest in stay liquid, and expenditures for public welfare (i.e. the losers and chiselers) are slashed.

The first principle of political economy is that the scope of democracy depends on the range of views and interests (typically tightly linked) of the owning and controlling class. Genuine public debate and decision-making extends only to those issues on which the elites are divided. In what country today is there a significant division among political-economic elites over core economic questions? How would our situation be different if Obama, Cameron, Merkel, Sarkozy et al. had been on the losing side of their elections?

So, the current mess is not the result of a failure by intellectuals—although clearer, less ideologically-driven thinking by economists would certainly be a good thing and might make a small dent at the margin. As long as there are even a few economists who proclaim the virtues of austerity and deregulation, however, their views will dominate. They haven’t won a battle of ideas; they are simply the ones who have been handed the microphone.

The real problem is political, and it is profound. Unless we can unseat the class that sees the world only through its portfolios, they may well take us all the way down. Unfortunately, no one seems to have a clue how such a revolution can be engineered in a modern, complex, transnational economy.

There were also some excellent comments in the discussion:

PQuincy said…

I’m a historian, and I think the past confirms your assessment of elite behavior and priorities, not only in the last 2 centuries of mass-based polities, but since the rise of large-scale states altogether. Political contention is almost always limited to a narrow range of issues on which those with power disagree, meaning that significant change (and there has been significant change in the political sphere, as well as the economic one) generally results from elite conflicts, not from ‘popular’ pressure. In fairness, elite contention does open gaps for genuinely ‘progressive’ change, and that’s an important lever for intellectuals to remember…but as you say, academics, thinkers, et al. are as a rule never in a position to have more than a marginal effect.

It’s not a promising situation now, structurally: a series of positive feedback loops in the political sphere are actually concentrating the influence of what I am forced to call a “reactionary clique”, at a time when the policies pursued by that clique are, at least on a larger time-frame, seriously destabilizing. But the narcotic effects of power are such that those who drive the dynamics of elite conflict rarely see the larger picture — behave, for all practical purposes. as though they were incapable of seeing the larger picture (call it, if you like, discursive hegemony), and those who believe they see a larger picture are structurally excluded from bringing about changes in response to their perception.

And…

Re-Considering …. said…

Thanks for the very well thought out reasoning in you post.

While you correctly identify the problem and its solution (current “ruling class” and its unseating), you are shy in suggesting how a solution might come about. While I do not advocate violence, history has shown us that fundamentally there are two ways by which subjugated classes improve their position. A traumatic way and less traumatic one.

Revolutions (most egregious examples are the French, Bolshevik, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions), whereby the ruling class, along with its interests, are eliminated by the subjugated classes. A traumatic event indeed, but, in my opinion, not sustainable in the long run unless the entire world adopts those political and economic paradigms.

Less traumatic and, more sustainable in the long term, are the outcomes of strong labor and student movements like the ones that took place in Europe in the 60s and 70s. Those movements made sure to convey to the ruling classes the message that a more equitable wealth distribution and effective social safety net were needed to avoid the extremes and dispossession that a revolution would involve. Reluctantly, the ruling class complied and the social safety nets and income distributions typical of Western Europe emerged.

In the same light, one must interpret the recent unrests in Western European countries (UK, Greece, France) (and most recently in Israel) as a response to the austerity measures taken by conservative governments of these countries to protect rentiers and capitalists. The austerity movement is trying to undo at least some (ideally, all) of the achievements of the 60s and 70s and redistribute wealth away from the “ruled classes”, when it is clearly the “ruling class” that should bear most of the cost of its disastrous, reckless, and self-serving policies. While the current message in Western Europe is still not of the same intensity of the 60s and 70s due to a current better wealth distribution than that of the 60s, the message is similar in content and direction. Its intensity may increase if the rentiers and capitalists will insist with their policies.

So, why the US labor and student movements do not materialize or are active to the same extent of the ones in Europe? The answer is very simple… while in Europe the “ruled classes” realized a long time ago that there will never be cooperation between them and the “ruling class”, in the US people still believe and pursue the American dream, which is fueled by the once in a while admission of few “mortals” on Mount Olympus. Let’s also not forget that constant sense of guilt passed on by the Pilgrims that, somewhat, it is exclusively the individual’s fault if his/her life is not better… and, maybe, the Pilgrims they were right given that US citizens keep electing the same (type of) people over and over to lead them. After all, wouldn’t you rather have a beer with a nice guy from Texas or Hawaii than protesting in some square?

And…

TheTrucker said…

I stand fittingly chastised for my indictment of the economists.

The Tea Party may well have hit upon a method to overcome the current problems. A constitutional convention to propose particular modifications to federal government structure might seem to be the way out. But that is a holdover from the time when people rode a horse to the nation’s capital in order to be seated in the discussion chamber. The problem is best resolved buy an incorruptible on line polling system of direct democracy in which various policies are proposed and tested for consensus. I do not trust the pollsters and I do not feel that they ask the right questions. At present we have the “super committee” approach which goes in the wrong direction totally. This election of Dems or Pugs who then decide what is the best way to maintain their own power has got to go.

I know that the public is easy to fool. The Republicans prove it every day. Yet there is no acceptable substitute for self governance. When we look at the polls we find that taxing the rich is the majority opinion and that social welfare is a high priority. Yet there is no way to act upon this consensus because the rich own the government. That must change, and it cannot change from the top. Surely there must be a peaceful means of revolution.

If a policy and polling system can be created that is impervious to tampering and corruption then it is entirely possible to supplant the current system or to dramatically improve the current system’s performance. I see no other way.

A Contagion of Bad Ideas. Not Only Slaves to Defunct Economists, but Slaves to Bad Ideas.

I’m still away on the road (which is why comments and questions in the last week have gone unanswered).  However, while I’m away, here’s a point made by Joseph Stiglitz at Project-Syndicate.org.  John Maynard Keynes famously said that today’s policy-makers are the slaves of defunct economists.  Joseph says, and I agree, that today’s policy makers are really the slaves of not only defunct economists, but some very bad and discredited ideas from those economists.  It’s these bad ideas that are hurting us the most.

Stiglitz observes the urgency with policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are eagerly pursuing contractionary policies at a time when growth is negligible and unemployment persists at a very high level. In the U.S., the Republicans threatened a government shutdown and/or default if the government didn’t significantly cut spending while refusing to raise taxes even on the very rich who have benefitted so much in the last decade. President Obama surrendered to the Republicans’ desire for contractionary policy, taking the Democrats with him.  All of this in a mistaken belief that somehow cutting spending, balancing the government budget, and reducing government debt (which leads to increased private debt) would somehow help the economy.  The problem is that while there are economic theories and economists who argue that such policy will work, these policies were discredited a long, long time ago.  Further these failed theories have never shown that they would work.  The historical evidence refutes the austerity position.

In Europe, it’s worse.  European leaders, having set  up a currency union (Eurozone) that stripped member nations of valuable fiscal policy tools, are convinced that cutting spending (which slows an economy) will balance their budgets and calm bond markets.  Unlike the U.S., which has it’s own central bank and therefore ends up paying very low interest rates on government debt (there’s no risk of default), Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and the others are all paying significant and rising interest rates on government debt.  Without their own central bank and wearing the Eurozone-imposed fiscal strait jackets, these countries continue to cut, their economies weaken and shrink, and their deficits just get bigger.  Why?  Because you can’t cut spending faster than tax revenues drop from the slower economy that the spending cut produced.  Nonetheless, the European leaders persist.

Stiglitz concludes in A Contagion of Bad Ideas:

The end of the stimulus itself is contractionary. And, with housing prices continuing to fall, GDP growth faltering, and unemployment remaining stubbornly high (one of six Americans who would like a full-time job still cannot get one), more stimulus, not austerity, is needed – for the sake of balancing the budget as well. The single most important driver of deficit growth is weak tax revenues, owing to poor economic performance; the single best remedy would be to put America back to work. The recent debt deal is a move in the wrong direction.

There has been much concern about financial contagion between Europe and America. After all, America’s financial mismanagement played an important role in triggering Europe’s problems, and financial turmoil in Europe would not be good for the US – especially given the fragility of the US banking system and the continuing role it plays in non-transparent CDSs.

But the real problem stems from another form of contagion: bad ideas move easily across borders, and misguided economic notions on both sides of the Atlantic have been reinforcing each other. The same will be true of the stagnation that those policies bring.

Joseph E. Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University, a Nobel laureate in economics, and the author of Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.  Excerpts republished with permission.

 

You might also like to read more from  or go to Project-Syndicate  home page.

Would a Balanced Budget Amendment Help or Hurt?

One component of the deal to raise the debt-ceiling is a requirement that Congress vote later this year on a “Balanced Budget Amendment” to the Constitution.  Is such an amendment a good idea?  At first glance, the idea seems attractive to a lot of people for whom the debt and deficits are seen as the key problem facing the economy (I am not one of these people).  After all, if you believe debt is bad, and debt comes from having deficits, then why not just pass a law amendment to the constitution that prohibits deficits, right? Well there are several problems with the idea.  Some are strategic – it’s really not a good idea to force a balanced budget every year.  But other problems are practical – the amendment, particularly as proposed now, simply wouldn’t work and would set up perverse incentives. Let’s look at these problems.

First off, there’s a bit of false advertising on the part of advocates of the “balanced budget amendment”.  The reality of what has been proposed goes beyond requiring a balanced budget.  A balanced budget would simply require government revenues to equal government expenditures each year.  The currently proposed amendment is really a “balanced budget with a strict cap on spending amendment”.  It has two parts. Not only would the budget have to be balanced each year, but the government spending would limited to 18% of GDP unless overridden by a 2/3 majority of Congress. The spending cap would limit government expenditures even if the budget were balanced.  The advocates of the balanced budget amendment, most of whom are Tea Party Republicans, are really proposing to re-write the Constitution to make it impossible for a majority of the duly elected Congress to expand the government beyond the limits they want.  It’s a rewrite of democracy.

The amendment and the spending cap in particular are totally unworkable in a practical sense.  First, the amendment and spending cap assumes that GDP and government spending are independent variables.  They aren’t.  In fact, government spending (G) helps determine GDP both directly since it  is a component of GDP and indirectly since the other components, consumption spending (C) and investment spending (I) and net exports (X-M) are themselves partially functions of government spending.  GDP = C + I + G + (X-M) by definition.  If you cut G, you cut GDP.  Suppose GDP = 100 and G = 20.  That’s government spending is 20% of GDP.  That would be too high under the amendment and would require a cut of government spending – revenue increase would not be allowed.  So suppose government cuts it’s spending to 18.  Keep in mind such a cut would be monumental. That would be a 10% (2/20) cut in government spending and we just had a paralyzing debate in Washington over how to cut spending by only 2-5%.  Imagine trying to cut 10%!   But even if the government did it, it wouldn’t work.  Because cutting government spending from 20 to 18 would take GDP down also.  The cuts would reduce both numerator and denominator.  If spending were cut to 18, then GDP would be no higher than 98, still leaving government spending as 18.37% of GDP. It would still be above the limit and require even deeper cuts which would then also cut GDP.  The reality would be even grimmer because C, I, and net exports all are partially influenced by government spending.  If you cut government spending for example, the people who got paid that government money, be they defense contractors, Social Security beneficiaries, teachers, or Medicare doctors, experience lower incomes.  They then cut their consumption spending and investment spending.  This is called the multiplier effect.

The practical problems are even greater when revenue is considered.  Government revenue, or taxes, are effectively a % of GDP.  That’s because virtually all the money collected by the government comes from GDP-related activity. Virtually all government revenue is either income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate profits taxes, or excise taxes on things that are used in production like gas.  If GDP goes up, then taxes collected goes up. If GDP goes down, then taxes go down also. Government spending goes in the opposite direction. When GDP goes up, many spending categories decline like unemployment compensation, welfare, Medicaid, etc. When GDP goes down, those spending items go up automatically.  These are called automatic stabilizers and they’re a major reason why recessions after World War II had been so mild compared to the depressions experienced routinely before WWII.  A balanced budget amendment means getting rid of automatic stabilizers and making mild recessions into worse recessions or even depressions. As  Simon Johnson at Baseline Conspiracy  put it:

 It makes no sense to target, as a matter of constitutional process, two numbers that are both outcomes of deeper economic processes.

A second very serious practical problem is with measurement.  GDP, while it’s commonly used and accepted, is only an economic concept, not a legal one.  The definition and calculation of GDP is subject to interpretation and depends on the prevailing views of statisticians and economists during any such era.  Simon Johnson at Baseline Conspiracy explains:

But GDP is not a legal concept – rather it is an economic measure, the details of which change all the time, subject to the prevailing view of best practice among statisticians.  Just to take one example, the flow value of housing services for people who own their houses is “imputed” to create a number that is roughly equivalent to what renters pay.  The goal is to more accurately measure a key component of consumption, which comprises the largest category of spending within GDP.  But the emphasis here is on “roughly” – the models used are sometimes called into question and must be revised from time to time.  And imputed spending on housing is a big number – probably around $1 trillion in today’s economy (with total GDP at about $15 trillion).

If an enterprising future administration wanted to lower spending relative to measured GDP, they could convene a panel of experts that could duly find that our current practice of not valuing household services – like cooking and taking care of children – is a statistical aberration as well as an affront to people who work very hard.  That should add at least $5 trillion to our annual GDP.  Alternatively, a statistical adjustment in the other direction would force real and painful spending cuts.  The constitution is the wrong place to pursue such details.

GDP is too fuzzy and imprecise of a measure, with too much estimation involved, to be enshrined in the constitution.  As an analogy, suppose we decided that we wanted to avoid the recent acrimonious debate over raising the debt-ceiling.  Suppose we thought too many Congresspeople acted too childishly.  Imagine if there were a proposal for a constitution amendment that required only “mature and intelligent ” adults “with an IQ above average” be allowed to run for Congress.  How would mature be defined?  How would it be measured?  We would make Congress dependent on a test, an IQ test, that itself is subject to revision and interpretation.  Later administrations would pressure psychologists to change the IQ test to satisfy the needs of their party.  The same happens if we enshrine GDP as a requirement in the Constitution.

In policy terms, the balanced budget amendment is a very bad idea. A balanced budget requirement forces the government to act pro-cyclically instead of counter-cyclically.  This means instead of fighting a recession, the government’s actions would make the recession worse.  Granted there are provisions in the amendment to waive the balanced budget requirement if GDP drops 10%, but keep in mind how severe that is.  The Great Recession/Financial Crisis of 2007-09 was only a 6% drop in GDP.  Government wouldn’t have been able to counter it.  The stimulus program, which was too small to trigger recovery but did successfully stop the free-fall, wouldn’t have happened until the crisis had indeed become as bad as the Great Depression.  A balanced budget amendment means a return to the old days before World War II when the U.S. routinely experienced severe depressions and financial crises. Again Simon Johnson:

.. sometimes it makes a great of sense to apply an economic stimulus to an economy in freefall.  One such moment was 1930 (and 1931 and 1932), when no stimulus was applied.  Other moments were 2008 and 2009; both President Bush and President Obama initiated stimulus packages.  When credit for and confidence in the private sector evaporates, do you really want the government sector to be forced to make quick cuts – or raise taxes?..

The second policy objection to this balanced budget amendment is that it is really a back-door attempt to circumvent democratic debate and decision-making.  The amendment proposes to limit government as part of the economy to 18%.  But why 18%?  Supporters claim that is what the U.S. has spent on average in recent decades.  But why is that the right number?  The size of government is a political, democratic choice that is up to the population at the time.  If today’s population wants a smaller government, they can elect politicians to do that.  And if some future generation should decide that 18% is not the right number, that maybe they want a different set of priorities and to devote a larger share of the nation’s resources to public goods, why shouldn’t they be able to do that?  Many nations devote a much higher % of GDP to public goods instead of private consumption goods.  Their economies are successful and their people are satisfied with it.  Having the current crop of legislators set a limit on what future generations may choose or do is not consistent with the concept of responsive democratic government.  It makes no more sense to enshrine an 18% limit on government spending in the constitution than it does to constitutionally enshrine a fixed limit on the number of soldiers the government may have.  It should be up to the representatives of each generation.

I’m not the only one who’s opposed to a balanced budget amendment.  And, the opposition isn’t all “Keynesian Democrats” (I don’t qualify as one of those either).  Simon Johnson, the author I’ve quoted above, is a former Chief Economist for the IMF.  The IMF has historically advocated and pushed for balanced budgets, yet it opposes this kind of handcuffs of economic policy.  Further, a Republican economist, Bruce Bartlett, has articulated many of these same problems with the amendment.