The Fed’s New “Twist” – Not Likely To Help

Late Wednesday The Federal Reserve announced a new program to try to stimulate  the economy so that maybe somebody, somewhere could get a new job, or maybe it’s so that critics would shut-up about employment.  It’s always hard to tell what The Fed’s real objectives are.  I don’t have time to explain now why it’s not likely to do much. But I didn’t want it to go unnoticed, so I’ll give you Stephanie Kelton from neweconomicperpectives, the UM Kansas City MMT people:

Ben Kenobi Launches Operation Twist: Will it Save the Republic?

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) just announced that it’s going to begin another round of asset buying, this time offsetting its purchases of longer-dated securities with sales of shorter term holdings. The goal? Flatten the yield curve. The hope? Engineer a recovery by helping homeowners refinance at lower rates and making broader financial conditions more attractive to would-be-borrowers.

At this point, it looks like Obi-Ben Kenobi realizes that Congress isn’t going to lend a hand with the recovery. Indeed, as a scholar of the Great Depression, he’s probably deeply concerned by the “Go Big” mantra that is now drawing support from people like Alice Rivlin, former Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve.  And so it is Ben, and Ben alone, who must fight to prevent the double-dip. It is as if he’s responding to the public’s desperate cry, “Help me Obi-Ben Kenobi. You’re my only hope.” Will it work?  Not a chance, but that conversation is taking place over at Pragmatic Capitalism, so drop in and find out why.  Below is a description, taken from the full FRB press release, that describes just what the Fed is going to do.  May the force be with us all.

“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee decided today to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less. This program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate.

To help support conditions in mortgage markets, the Committee will now reinvest principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. In addition, the Committee will maintain its existing policy of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.”

Yep, This Is What A Liquidity Trap Looks Like

People, businesses, and banks simply aren’t investing in the sense of putting financial wealth to work in productive purposes with the intent to produce goods and thereby produce profits.  Instead, folks, the ones who have financial wealth that is, are just sitting on cash.  They’re putting it in the bank at record low interest rates. The banks don’t want the extra deposits and are trying to discourage it.  Meanwhile the banks are just turning around and putting the money on deposit at The Federal Reserve where it sits idle. This is called a liquidity trap.

Calculated Risk directs us to this report:

From Scott Reckard at the LA Times: Bank deposits soar despite rock-bottom interest rates

Americans are pumping money into bank accounts at a blistering pace this year, sending deposits to record levels near $10 trillion …

In the last three months, accounts at U.S. commercial banks have increased $429 billion, or 10%, almost double the increase for all of last year.

The large amount of cash only adds to expenses such as paying for deposit insurance premiums. … [banks] have slashed interest payments to discourage customers. Wells Fargo & Co. … halved its payments on one-year certificates of deposits to 0.1%; Citigroup … dropped its payment to a paltry 0.3%.

[Some banks are] stashing it in a safe but unrewarding place: Federal Reserve banks, which are paying them an interest rate of just 0.25% to tend the funds. Such deposits rose to more than $1.6 trillion at the end of August from about $1 trillion a year earlier, according to the Fed.

So why is this really significant?  Simple. Neo-classical/neo-liberal macro theories, the theories that conservatives have been relying on, basically say this can’t happen. It’s irrational and according to those models, people and firms never act irrationally.  So who or what theories say a liquidity trap is possible?  Keynesian theory.  Yes, the whole idea of a liquidity trap in which macro circumstances are such that firms and households would rather hold cash than put it to some productive investment purpose comes from Keynes.

A liquidity trap is also significant because it means that monetary policy, the raising/lowering of interest rates and the purchase/sale of bonds by the central bank, isn’t very effective in a liquidity trap. The Federal Reserve can make funds available for investment, but it can’t force banks to lend or firms to invest or households to spend.  Monetary policy in times of a liquidity trap has been likened to pushing on a string.  The string doesn’t really move much.  Again, neo-classical models don’t allow for the possibility of a liquidity trap.  Indeed they start with assumptions that pretty much exclude the possibility of there ever being one.  Models and theories that start with the assumption that “A” can never happen aren’t of any use in trying solve “A” when it really does show up.

Why do people seek money instead of useful investment in a liquidity trap?  Simple. There are two reasons why firms and people would seek to hold financial wealth as money instead of useful, profitable investments.

  • First, profitable investments require a growing economy and expectations of a growing economy.  If firms and people have no confidence that the economy will grow or that any growth will last, then they don’t invest. No need to expand capacity at the business if you won’t need the extra capacity.
  • Second, if you expect the economy to get worse and/or have deflation happen, then it makes enormous sense to be cash instead of things.  Cash actually is profitable and gains in real purchasing power when deflation happens.  So I would interpret from the above data that people, banks, and firms are expecting more deflation and not expecting inflation.

What to do in a liquidity trap?  Theoretically (and Krugman/Delong push this idea)  you could have the central bank (Federal Reserve) make some sort of commitment to higher future inflation.  But that’s in theory only.  It’s not been proven.  What’s experience say?  We have a choice.  Suffer through it, experience a prolonged depression that could easily last a generation, and make do with lower living standards for the vast majority but see the really wealthy become even more wealthy.  This is the story of the Long Depression in the late 1800′s.   Or, we could turn to aggressive fiscal policy. Keynesian style spending for job creation.  That’s been proven.  It worked in the 1930′s until it was abandoned in 1937, it worked in 1939-1940 with the start of WWII (not my choice of spending priorities), and it worked quite well in the 1950′s through the 1970′s in achieving a higher average annual growth rate in GDP than has been achieved since.

Unfortunately, too many economists, and the politicians that follow them, are so married to their ideologically-based models that they persist in the theory even when the facts contradict it.

Founding Fathers Would Have Opposed A Balanced Budget Amendment – The Purpose of National Government Was to Borrow

Both official Washington and the chattering political classes have spent most of the past 12 months debating how to cut the government budget, reduce deficits, and limit debt.  Key groups, and perhaps the most vocal and strident groups in the debate, have been the self-described “constitutional conservatives” and Tea Party types. They have staked out the position that government deficits, debt, and indeed any taxation except the most minimal taxation is un-American and antithetical to “first principles” of the Founding Fathers.  They maintain a myth that the U.S. Constitution was created to limit the U.S. government’s ability to tax or run a deficit.  Unfortunately for them, history and the constitution itself tell a different tale.

Historian William Hogeland punctures the myth that the Founding Fathers would have agreed with today’s Tea Party types using an historian’s favorite tools – the facts. The following originally appeared at New Deal 2.0. Besides the applicability to today’s debates, it makes fascinating reading about the historical situation that led to the Constitution after the Revolution.  (emphasis below in bold are mine)

Why Debt Ceilings and Balanced-Budget Requirements Violate the Original Intent of the Constitution

So-called “constitutional conservatives” ignore the realpolitik of our nation’s origins.

In a critical and entertaining portrait of the anti-tax activist Grover Norquist, the New York Times columnist Frank Bruni presented Norquist as an absolutist obsessed with forcing modern political life to conform to ideas that Norquist associates with the American founders’ first principles.  Of course, Norquist is by no means alone in taking that position. That the Constitution came into existence to keep taxes low, the federal government small, and national debt at zero is an article of faith among many who, like Michele Bachmann, have taken to calling themselves “constitutional conservatives.” And faith is required to believe it, as the Norquist interview shows. To make his supposedly constitutional argument, Norquist cites the first amendment on freedom of religion and the second on the right to keep and bear arms, and then goes on to cite absolutely nothing, in either the articles or the amendments, that so much as hints at a constitutional requirement to balance the federal budget, avoid debt, tax no more than people like Norquist deem appropriate, and keep government small.

He can’t cite anything to that effect because while balancing budgets, restraining borrowing, and keeping taxes low and government small might be good goals, depending on what you mean by them, it is impossible to locate in the founding national law any requirement to accomplish them. Indeed, the reality of founding history leads to the reverse conclusion.

The Constitution came about precisely to enable a newly large government — a national one — to tax all Americans for the specific purpose of funding a large public debt. Neither Alexander Hamilton nor his mentor the financier Robert Morris made any bones about that purpose; James Madison was among their closest allies; and Edmund Randolph of Virginia opened the Constitutional Convention by charging the delegates to redress the country’s failure to fund — not pay off, fund — the public debt, by creating a national government.

Beginning during the War of Independence, and continuing throughout the 1780s, American nationalists committed themselves to a small class of upscale high financiers (largely identical with the American nationalists), who had bought bonds from the confederation Congress in hopes of earning regular, tax-free, 6% interest payments — not in the Congress’s crashing paper currency but in hard, cold metal or its equivalent, stable bills of exchange. Morris, Hamilton, Madison, and others believed that swelling the debt to immense proportions would make a coherent nation out of thirteen squabbling states and make that nation a player on the world economic stage. Their plan to do so depended partly on making military-officer pay a pension, thus turning the entire officer class into public bondholders — and giving Congress new power to tax all Americans to support that debt.

Hamilton is often reflexively presented as finding inventive ways to pay down the national debt. His real accomplishments were of course “funding and assumption” — absorbing the states’ war debts in the federal one and funding that huge obligation via nationally collected and nationally enforced taxes.

Hence the all-important provisions of the Constitution giving Congress very broad powers to tax and acquire debt. To 18th-century American nationalists across the political spectrum — to our founders and framers, that is, from Hamilton to Madison, from Morris to Randolph, from the financiers to the planters — national taxing and borrowing were ineluctably connected to the very purpose of national government.

Nobody has to like it. But the original intent of the Constitution involved sustaining and managing public debt via taxation.

Both the articles and the amendments do, of course, limit government and restrict its power. But no ratified amendment has ever qualified Congress’s power of the purse, which in the minds of the framers explicitly involved the power to take on debt and fund it. In their tweets and blogs, “constitutional conservatives” have been promoting a balanced-budget amendment with reference to the tired notion that since households and small businesses must balance their budgets (as if!), government must too. They link that economically useless prescription to the widespread fantasy that our Constitution was written, amended, and ratified for just such a purpose. The framers saw it just the other way.

But really everybody, not just “constitutional conservatives,” buys into the fantasy now. History is rarely helpful politically. It’s hard to imagine liberals bringing to debt-ceiling and balanced-budget debates the painful realpolitik of our national origins, which show the Constitution existing, originally, to finance the investing class and yoke that class’s interest (in every sense) to national power. Thus the Times gives the Bruni piece a headline referring to Norquist’s “dangerous purity” — as if the danger in Norquist’s approach lies in a too-rigid insistence on basic principle. There’s nothing purist about Norquist. Whether his ideas may be proven right or proven wrong, they are anything but originalist. Like those of Bachmann and the rest of the anti-tax right, Norquist’s principles are novel, innovative, and weirdly postmodern, extra-constitutional at best.

Stark realism about the actual founding purposes of the Constitution will always have limited use in political debate. But it would be nice, at least — though unlikely — if we would argue these issues on their merits, and leave the Constitution alone.

William Hogeland is the author of the narrative histories Declaration and The Whiskey Rebellion and a collection of essays, Inventing American History. He has spoken on unexpected connections between history and politics at the National Archives, the Kansas City Public Library, and various corporate and organization events. He blogs at http://www.williamhogeland.com.

Why the Whole Idea of “Rating” Government Bonds is Absurd

James Kwak at Baseline Scenario offers a great analogy and explanation for why the whole concept of a private rating agency such as Standard and Poor’s putting a credit rating on government bonds is absurd.  It adds no new information.  Now if S&P wants to rate the Greater Podunk Water Authority bonds or some such, that provides a service.  But they add nothing at the national level. James says:

Still, I think the whole thing is preposterous. S&P downgrading the United States is like Consumer Reports downgrading Coca-Cola. Consumer Reports is a great institution. For example, if you want to know how reliable a 2007 Ford Explorer is going to be, they have done more research than anyone to figure out the reliability history of every single vehicle. Those ratings are a real public service, since they add information to the world. But when it comes to Coke and Pepsi, everyone has an opinion already, and no one cares which one, according to Consumer Reports, “really” tastes better. When S&P rated some tranche of a CDO AAA back in 2006, it meant that some poor analyst had run some model fed to her by an investment bank and made sure that the rows and columns added up correctly, and the default probability percentage at the end was below some threshold. It might have been crappy information, but it was new information. When S&P rates long-term Treasuries AA+, it means . . . nothing. And if any serious buy-side investor were tempted to take S&P’s rating into account, she would be deterred by the fact that the analysis that produced the rating included a $2 trillion arithmetic error.

When it comes to sovereign debt issued by major countries, investors already use their own judgment instead of following credit ratings. These are the current ten-year yields for fifteen countries that had AAA ratings on Friday:

  • Switzerland: 1.17
  • Singapore: 1.79
  • Germany: 2.34
  • Sweden: 2.34
  • United States: 2.56
  • Denmark: 2.58
  • Canada: 2.63
  • Norway: 2.63
  • United Kingdom: 2.68
  • Netherlands: 2.77
  • Finland: 2.90
  • Austria: 2.97
  • France: 3.14
  • New Zealand: 4.50
  • Australia: 4.64

How To Tell A Market Commentator Doesn’t Understand Markets or Finance or What They’re Talking About

It’s Monday, Aug 9.  The stock markets are declining significantly, although anybody who says it’s panic doesn’t remember 2008.  Anyway, lots of market commentators, you know the types on cable TV news networks, are all claiming the decline is due to the S&P downgrade.  They’re wrong. Completely wrong as I pointed out already. But just to reinforce my point, here’s Paul Krugman just minutes ago:

Carnage in stock markets as I write — and all of the headlines I see attribute it to S&P’s downgrade.

They really are trying to make my head explode, aren’t they?

Once again: S&P declared that US debt is no longer a safe investment; yet investors are piling into US debt, not out of it, driving the 10-year interest ratebelow 2.4%. This amounts to a massive market rejection of S&P’s concerns.

The “signature” of debt concerns should be stock and bond prices both falling; what we actually see is those prices moving in opposite directions. And that’s normally the signature of concerns about a weak economy and deflation risk (see Japan, decline of).

What triggered economy fears? To some extent I think this is a Wile E. Coyote moment, with investors suddenly noticing just how weak the fundamentals are. Also, the mess in Europe.

And maybe, maybe there is an S&P story — but not the one you think. Arguably, that downgrade will bully policy makers into even more deflationary, contractionary policies than they would have undertaken otherwise, which has the perverse effect of making US debt more attractive, since the alternatives are worse.

But all the Very Serious People, having totally misdiagnosed our problems so far, will probably double down on that wrong diagnosis as markets fall.

Oh by the way.  The 10 year bond rate is now down to 2.38% from 2.6% on Friday.  The  3 month and 6 month rates are less than 0.01% – essentially zero interest rate.

The Market Shrugs Off Rating Downgrade, Market Is Worried About Real Economy.

It’s now Monday morning, Aug 8.  It’s been roughly 60 hours since S&P downgraded the rating on U.S. government bonds.  In that 60 hours the media, particularly TV talking head channels, have been breathlessly awaiting what they felt was a certain market panic on Monday. Clearly interest rates would go up they said.

They were wrong.  The early results are in.   U.S. government bond prices have  gone up this morning!  That means government bond yields (interest rates) have actually gone down!  The 10 year bond actually dropped from 2.6% yield on Friday’s close to 2.48% at 9:30 am ET on Monday.

It’s really no surprise if you pay attention to real economic events and not listen to the TV media types who think talking in serious tones is a substitute for actually understanding economics.  First, serious investors, the ones who vote with their money in the market already know everything that S&P knows.  In fact, they know S&P has a really bad track record. So the rating doesn’t mean much to them.

What does matter is what choices or alternatives they have for investing their money.  Right now, the signs from the real economy in both the U.S. and Europe are grim.  Europe is struggling to achieve any growth outside Germany with several major economies actually declining due to their governments’ embrace of budgetary austerity.  The U.K. is on the ragged edge of another recession, again due to government cutbacks. The U.S. is barely registering postive growth with only 0.8% growth rate in the first half of 2011.  It’s clear, too, from the debt ceiling debate that the U.S. won’t be seeing much stimulus anytime soon and likely will join the Europeans in austerity budget cutting. Cutting that will only slow the economy further and possibly drive another recession.  So what theses investors know is that economic growth isn’t likely and that’s bad for stocks.  Stock markets aren’t the place to be now.

Further, Europe is continuing it’s slow-motion debt default crisis issues.  In the past week or so the crisis has spread beyond Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Now it’s Italy and Spain too.  Even AAA-rated France is finding it’s bonds trading at significantly raised interest rates.  Now the debt crises in Europe are real problems because the nations inside the Euro zone don’t have control over their own currency, they don’t have a central bank, and they borrow in some other currency (Euro) rather than one of their own.  This is unlike the U.S.  The problem is the uncertainty the debt crises in Europe are creating.  The global financial and economic system is once again showing great signs of weakness, fragility, and uncertainty – just like 2007 and 2008.

When uncertainty abounds and about the only sure thing is that growth will be weak at best, it’s time to put your money in something safe and wait it out.  The safest thing in the world (in any volume) is still U.S. government bonds.  So what we have is investors moving into U.S. government bonds because they don’t want to be in anything else.  Everything else is too risky.  So we get increased demand for U.S. bonds and that lowers interest rates on those bonds. This is what financial analysts and economists call a “flight to safety”.

The S and P Downgrade Decision Stinks of Politics and Corruption.

Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism (an unusually good source of very in-depth, timely commentary) offers some strong evidence and analysis of how the S&P decision to downgrade the U.S. debt stinks.  I’ve already talked about how it’s really irrelevant at the economic level and how it’s not likely to change things substantially.  I’ve also written about how S&P doesn’t have a very good track record.

But Yves, who has extensive connections on Wall Street and in the trading/banking community, brings two other aspects to light. First, this downgrade, along with the threatened downgrade of a few state governments earlier this past week, was leaked before the announcement.  The proper procedure is to make such announcements after the close of markets and to not allow any leaks.  Leaks constitute insider information.  They let selected individuals make profits because they know what’s coming.  For example, as Yves suggests, if some traders or banks or others were told in advance, even just a few hours ahead that a downgrade announcement would be made, they could make millions.  How?  They could either place orders, particularly using derivatives, in anticipation of the move.  After the prices of bonds change due to the announcement, you sell.  But there’s a simpler way.  Just place an investment bet using the derivatives that based on the volume of trading.  Any announcement is certain to trigger a higher volume of trading.  Leaking news of announcements is an easy way for S&P to enrich it’s favorite friends. Yves notes:

Treasury yields fell 50 basis points last week despite the risk of a downgrade being very well telegraphed. S&P had asked for $4 trillion in deficit reductions (it tried disavowing that number) and made it clear it was going off to brood and might take action. And this market response took place with S&P leaking like a sieve. Not only was Twitter alight early on Friday with rumors of the downgrade, but some parties purportedly got the memo earlier in the week. From a credible source via e-mail:

Good friend passed on a note from a hedge-funder who thinks the S&P not only fudged its figures for today’s downgrade, but leaked it in-advance earlier this week to a few hedge fund insiders who made a killing off it. That would square with the fake “states face bankruptcy” panic scam earlier this year, which made a few people a lot of fast money.

I assume they did not make a directional bet but went long vol.

So what if bond yields go up 50 basis points on Monday, which is normally a monster move? It just puts us back to where we were last Monday.

So why didn’t investors dump Treasuries with this threat hanging over the market’s head? Maybe investors have wised up and realize the ratings are worthless (more on that shortly).

Yves goes on to explain a bigger, stinkier aspect to the downgrade.  It’s politics and a possible we’ll-help-Republicans-if-they-protect-us deal between Republicans and S&P.

Jane Hamsher highlights the hypocrisy of the S&P rating, since it shifted from its 2010 rationale of demographic stress to a February 2011 focus on entitlements. And it didn’t bat an eye at the $2.6 trillion deficit-increasing Bush tax cut extension at year end 2010. More from Hamsher:

Neither Moody’s nor Fitch downgraded US debt at this time. And S&P can’t quite come up with a consistent answer about why they are out there by themselves. It’s like they looked at a public opinion poll, decided that there was no way anyone would argue with “partisan bickering” as a justification, and crossed their fingers that nobody would actually question what it is that they were justifying.

S&P is playing footsie with the Republicans, who are passing bills to relieve them of the legal liabilities that Dodd-Frank exposes them to — even as the SEC is investigating S&P for fraud in the mortgage meltdown.

Some said that S&P wouldn’t dare downgrade the US debt. But it was all over four days ago when Pimco’s Mohammed El-Erian said that S&P was “under pressure” on the US rating.

If you didn’t happen to catch Devan Sharma’s testimony before the House Financial Services Committee last week, this was what he said:

As Dodd-Frank rulemaking progresses, we believe it is critical that new regulations preserve the ability of NRSROs to make their own analytical decisions without fear that those decisions will be later second-guessed if the future does not turn out to be as anticipate or that in publishing a potential controversial view, they will expose themselves to regulatory retaliation.

Pressures of that sort could only undermine the significant progress we believe has been made over the years by rating agencies and regulators alike to provide the market with transparent, quality and generally independent views about the credit-worthiness of issuers and their securities. I thank you for the opportunity to participate in the hearing and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

“Pressure.”

That’s what Rep. Randy Neugebauer, chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee said on April 29, when he requested documents from the administration: Treasury officials “may have exerted too much pressure on S&P.” The Republicans were already laying the tracks for S&P’s defense in April.

Here are a few more dots to connect the timeline:

April 18: Mitt Romney: “The Obama presidency was downgraded today.”
April 20: Mitt Romney: “Standard & Poor’s, one of the rating agencies, just downgraded their view of the future for America…If you will, they downgraded the Obama presidency.”
July 15: WSJ — “The Obama downgrade.”

They’ve been cooking this one for a while. S&P will defend themselves from the accusation of overt partisan manipulation by claiming the Treasury “pressured” them not to downgrade US debt. The media will focus on what Geithner did or didn’t say during his meetings with S&P in March and April. Nobody will ask about the ridiculous excuses S&P has made for the downgrades, or the fact that they are trying to wreck the American economy just as they did the British economy by playing God with their austerity prescriptions.

People are focused on the market implications of the downgrade, but that isn’t what this is about. It’s about a President who will now be relentlessly tagged with responsibility for a rating given by a disgraced organization whose victims should have liquidated them long ago.

As Politico reported, White House officials feared a downgrade more than they feared default.

This stinks.  I have only quoted the a small part of this story.  I urge readers to go to nakedCapitalism and read the whole article.  This whole downgrade by S&P is politics.  S&P is being used (quite enthusiastically with their cooperation) by bankers and politicians who desire to dismantle the social democratic state.

 

 

 

S and P: Not the Best Judge of Credit-Worthiness

The media and the talking heads will no doubt make a big deal about S&P downgrading the U.S. debt from AAA to AA and threatening to go to A in 6 months.  But it’s really nonsense. The U.S. it is not possible for a sovereign nation with it’s own currency, it’s own central bank, and that borrows in that same currency to go into default.  I just heard Faux Fox News say this afternoon that this will cause all of us to pay higher interest rates on home mortgages and car loans!  Honestly, where do they get these people?  Fox claimed that your car loan and mortgage are “pegged” to the 10 year government bond rate.  Nope.  Not true.

Anyway, what we should be doing is taking another look at this whole bond-ratings scam.  Standard & Poor’s basically has a business model where they rate bond issues in return for fees paid by the banks selling those bonds.  There’s no reason or need for them to rate government issues except maybe for obscure municipal bonds where the information for an informed decision isn’t easy to come by.

So let’s recap how S&P has done in the past.  My favorite two highlights are Japan and Lehman Brothers.  In Japan, this is how interest rates (yields) on 10 year Japanese bonds have behaved since Jan. 2000:

It was in January 2001, right about when the yield hit it’s peak of 2.0% that S&P downgraded Japanese 10 year bonds indicating S&P thought the bonds were riskier and should pay an interest rate premium.  Kind of looks like Mr. Market and Ms. Investors didn’t agree.  Not having learned their lesson on the economics of sovereign debt, S&P did it again in January  2011 with another downgrade.  I think S&P needs to throw out their models and go back to school.

Now let’s look at the other side.  In September 2008, the day before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, S&P rated them “A”.  Two weeks later, even though Lehman had already gone bankrupt, S&P still didn’t get it and defended their rating:

“In our view, Lehman had a strong franchise across its core investment banking, trading, and investment management business,” S&P stated. “It had adequate liquidity relative to reasonably severe and foreseeable temporary stresses.”

Source: CFO Magazine

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. Government Debt Downgraded by S&P. What a Farce. And Non-Issue.

Yesterday after the U.S. markets closed, Standard & Poor’s downgraded their credit rating on U.S. government bonds.  Previously, the U.S. government had enjoyed for over 70 years the highest possible rating:  AAA.  Now it is “only” going to be AA+.  We should note that the other two major bond-ratings agencies, Moody’s and Fitch’s still rate U.S. debt as AAA.  So what does this mean?  Does it reflect poorly on the U.S.?  Not really. It’s all a farce and it reflects poorly on Standard & Poor’s.

There are many reports in the news, especially in local newspapers and by non-economics reporters, to the effect that this downgrade means higher interest rates.  Some have even suggested that everyone in the U.S. including individuals and corporations and states will pay higher interest rates.  That’s all nonsense.  Not only is a national government not like a household or firm, but bond ratings for governments don’t work like credit ratings for individuals. If you credit score as an individual (those things called FICO scores), then when your credit rating is downgraded you pay higher interest rates for car loans, mortgages, and credit cards.  When governments get downgraded, especially from AAA to only AA+, it doesn’t directly affect interest rates.  Government debt interest rates aren’t really “set” by anybody.  Government debt interest rates are the result of market auctions of the bonds.  If demand for the bonds increases, then prices rise.  In bonds, prices are the inverse of the yield, or interest rate.  When prices go up, then interest rates have effectively gone down.

Lately U.S. Treasury yields (interest rates) have been dropping.  They’ve been dropping regardless of whether you compare now to 3 months ago or just 2 weeks ago.  They’ve been dropping regardless of which maturity (3 month, 6 mo, 2, 5, 10,or 30 year) you look at.  This means that bond prices have been rising. That means there is more demand for U.S. Treasuries.  Not exactly the story of default and risk that S&P maintains, right?  Right.

U.S. Treasury Yields

Maturity Last
Yield
Previous
Yield
3 Month 0.01% 0.01%
2 Year 0.22% 0.25%
5 Year 1.25% 1.13%
10 Year 2.56% 2.46%
30 Year 3.82% 3.72%
Data as of Aug 5 via http://money.cnn.com/data/bonds
So what does this really mean?  The best, clearest, most direct answers I’ve seen are from Wall Street Journal blogger Mark Gongloff.  Here are some of his answers to questions:

Q:What’s the difference between AAA and AA+? That doesn’t sound so bad.

A: It’s not so bad — and there’s not much difference. Technically, AA+ is considered “high grade” credit, while AAA is “prime.” The likelihood of getting paid back by a AA+ credit is considered “very strong,” while a AAA credit’s likelihood of paying you back is “extremely strong.” See the difference? Me neither.

And the U.S. is a special case, given its status as the world’s largest economy and printer of the world’s reserve currency. If your personal credit score falls, then you will almost certainly have to pay more to borrow. The U.S. can get away with a slight credit-rating downgrade without having to pay more to borrow. In fact, many other large, developed economies, including Japan, Canada and Australia, have lost AAA ratings in the past and not had to pay more to borrow in the long run.

Q:Luxembourg is rated AAA. Is the U.S. really a worse credit risk than Luxembourg?

A: No way. Luxembourg is a great country and a perfectly sound credit risk, but it lacks many of the advantages of the U.S., including the aforementioned economy and reserve currency, along with a very large printing press for that currency. If anything, this downgrade exposes some of the other discrepancies in ratings around the world. Should bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Facility, the entity set up to help bail out European sovereigns, really have a AAA credit rating, for example?

Q:Won’t some investors be forced to sell because of even this small downgrade?

A: Maybe, but not very many. Given the liquidity and relative safety of Treasurys, many regulators and money managers put Treasurys in a special category apart from rating considerations. Other managers are considering tweaking their rules to allow them to keep Treasurys.

U.S. banking regulators have confirmed that the downgrade will not force banks, which have big Treasury holdings, to raise any more capital as a cushion against losses. Short-term Treasury ratings weren’t affected, so money-market funds won’t have to sell

Q:What about foreign investors? Surely they’ll sell.

A: Probably, but they may not sell much. They’ve been trying to diversify their holdings for years, but they keep running up against an impregnable hurdle: They’ve got nowhere else to go. For better or worse, Treasurys are the largest fixed-income asset class in the world, by far, and the likelihood of default is next to nothing. The dollar is, for now at least, the world’s reserve currency, meaning foreign central banks will have to keep buying Treasurys. There’s really no other alternative available.

Q:What is the likely effect on interest rates, then?

A: Very hard to say, given all the cross-currents affecting markets right now. In a perverse sense, this downgrade has come at just about the best possible time for the U.S., despite the turmoil in the markets and anxiety about the economy. Those very uncertainties have driven investors around the world — including foreign central banks — to the safety of U.S. Treasurys, pushing U.S. borrowing costs to nearly their lowest levels in generations. So any increase in rates will come off a very low base. If interest rates rise half a percentage point, for example, that might put 10-year Treasury yields at 3% — still an extraordinarily low rate.

What’s more, the market has been bracing for this downgrade for a while, particularly on Friday, when rumors of it were widespread. It’s possible that most of the increase in yields has already happened. In any event, the history of Japan, et al, suggests that a downgrade might have no long-term impact on borrowing costs at all. Investors will likely respond more to inflation pressures, the direction of short-term interest rates and economic growth than to what one or more rating agencies say.

Remember that S&P are the same folks that told us that bonds backed by sub-prime mortgages were AAA a few years ago.  They are the same people that rated Lehman Brothers debt as “A” the night before Lehman declared bankruptcy. They are the same people that downgraded Japan over 10 years ago and yet Japan still pays lower interest rates on government debt than the U.S. despite having a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 200%, more than twice the U.S.  S&P has no special knowledge of the U.S.’s financial position that you don’t have access to.  They get all their data from the news too.

I really do not expect much direct impact from S&P’s decision on financial markets.  It may cause some temporary churn and increase volatility as a few funds might find they are legally required to sell because they must legally only own AAA bonds, but event that’s not likely.  I’m not alone in my prediction here either. Yves Smith at NakedCapitalism and others share my view.  Fortunately banks have been told that the rating change will not affect how bank capital requirements are calculated. Quoting the Wall Street Journal:

Late Friday, federal regulators said the downgrade wouldn’t affect risk-based capital requirements for U.S. banks—the cushion banks must hold to protect against losses. The Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and other federal banking regulators said in a statement the lowering “will not change” the risk weights for Treasury securities and other securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government or government agencies.

If you believe S&P, then you must believe that Luxembourg and Leichtenstein are more secure, more powerful economies with a brighter future than the United States.