On the Occupy Wall Street (and Everywhere Else) Movement

I’ve been asked what I think of the Occupy Wall Street Movements.  I say it’s about d*** time.  The anger and discontentment that the movement has tapped into is real and has been building for a long time.  The mass numbers of people – like say the 99%  - have good reasons to be angry. The  U.S. economy is very sick and it’s not really recovering.  For at least three decades now the rules in the economy have gradually been changed.  The overwhelming net effect of all these institutional and structural changes has been to transfer income and wealth from the bottom 80% of the income scale (odds are that means you!) to the upper 1%.  What about the other 19%, the ones in the top 20% but not the top 1%?  They haven’t really lost in number terms but they’ve struggled to hold on.  Their security is greatly reduced.  And now, the politicians that have been bought by the top 1% are coming for everybody’s Social Security and Medicare.

The American poor, working, and middle classes have been like the proverbial frog put into tepid water and then heated to boiling (note, yes, I know there’s evidence that frogs don’t behave that way in real life – it’s a metaphor, folks).  Gradually the rules were changed.  The banking and finance industries were deregulated – not all at once, but in a series of steps.  Despite massive (for that time) bailouts and bank rescues in the 1980′s savings and loan crash, we continued.  Union power was reduced.  Antitrust enforcement languished under a philosophy of “markets will self-enforce”.  The tax codes were changed to favor hedge fund managers and bankers.  Median household incomes began to stagnate while incomes at the top continued to grow and even accelerate.  A loud chorus of anti-”liberal” media, politicians, and think tanks constantly pounded an anti-government theme.  Meanwhile economic growth gradually slowed.  We lowered our expectations. Instead of demanding the growth rates of the 1950′s, 1960′s, and even much of the 1970′s, we began to settle for less but pretended it was more.  We shifted more and more of the cost of a  college education away from government and to students in the form of student loans.  For a long time, the working and middle classes were distracted from what was really happening.  The leaders blamed the people themselves.  It was getting harder and harder to keep up, let alone get ahead economically. We were distracted for a while by dreams of riches in an Internet dot-com bubble (“just pick the right start up and get rich”) or later in a housing bubble (“your house will make you rich ‘cuz home prices never drop”) or by endless wars and obsessions with terrrorism.

Then the crunch came in 2008.  The economy collapsed. But it wasn’t workers that crashed the economy – it was largely the banking and finance sector.  But the fall out hit just about everybody.  For 5-6 months we were on a trajectory to repeat the Great Crash and Great Depression of the 1930′s.  The same depression that conservative ideologue economists like Robert Lucas had claimed in 2003 was permanently “solved for all practical purposes” .  President Obama promised change and entered office in the midst of the collapse.  He wasn’t really prepared for this situation. The change Obama had originally envisioned was a more conservative, polite cutting back of social programs like Social Security.  The change we needed wasn’t the change that originally motivated him to run.

In response to the crisis and collapsing economy, the government responded – both the Bush and Obama administrations.  And they both pursued rather similar policies:   bailout the banks without even requiring sacrifice by the bank managers or the bank share and bond holders, and meanwhile offering some mild (relative to the problem) stimulus with much of the stimulus being in the form of tax cuts.  It hasn’t worked.  Well, I should be more precise.  It worked for the top 1% – the really, really wealthy and for Wall Street and the banks.  For the rest of us, it’s grim.  The economy stopped it’s free fall.  That was good. But it has never substantially begun a real recovery.  Unemployment is stuck at over 9%. The reality is worse than that number, though since large numbers have dropped out of the labor force and simply abandoned the hope of finding a job for now.  It’s been over 3 years since the crunch on Wall Street and there’s no recovery. Instead, politicians, both Democrat and Republican, have been spent the past year trying to cut spending, cut social programs, and make things worse for the 99% while cutting taxes further for the 1%.  It makes for anger and confusion. We are now in a workers depression.

The Tea Party movement of the last couple years had initially tapped into some of that populist anger.  But the Tea Party wasn’t/isn’t really a broad-based populist grass-roots movement.  It’s more of an Astroturf, faux populist movement with a lot of funding from very, very rich sources like the Koch brothers.  What’s more, it has become clear in the last year in Congress that the Tea Party doesn’t really have any solutions.  Last summer it was clear that some Tea Party people in Congress would rather have the U.S. default reach any kind of do-able compromises.  The vast majority of the 99% do not think a default by the U.S. government is a good thing.  The anger and frustration remains.

To make things worse, recent years have seen an increase in the power of large corporations.  The Supreme Court has ruled that corporations are “people” and that we the people cannot put any limit on political speech or spending by corporations.  Campaigns have become extraordinarily expensive.  The result is that politicians, even more so than ever, basically listen to and do the bidding of people on Wall Street and large corporations.  The average American has been frozen out of their own political processes.

I observed last winter during the uprisings in Tunisia and Eqypt that two ingredients of revolution are an educated population that learns or knows that a better condition is possible, and a political economy where there is no prospect for improved living standards.  Hopelessness turns to frustration which turns to anger.  That produces protest and demands for change.  As John F. Kennedy famously said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”  I also observed last  winter that the inequality in income is worse in the U.S. than it was in Tunisia, Eqypt, or the other Arab spring nations.  I also noted that for now demography was keeping the U.S. from breaking out in mass protest.  Basically the U.S. population is older and revolutionary protest is usually a young people’s phenomenon.  But there are limits.  The U.S. also has a very extensive history of protest-driven social and political change.  It’s really the last few decades of quiet between the civil rights & Vietnam protests of the 1960′s-70′s until recently that have been the unusual phenomenon.  The longer the U.S. persists in pursuing austerity policies that keep the economy from growing and transfer more wealth and power to the top 1%, the more the nation is playing with fire.

As it stands now, I stand with the Occupy Wall Street movement.  The lack of clear “leaders” and “demands” is a good thing.  I will contribute my help in the coming weeks by trying to further illuminate the issues involved.

Too Big to Fail Should Be Too Big to Exist

Against Monopoly has a great graphic that shows a big part of the problem with our financial sector and our economy.

How the Too Big to Fail Banks Got  So Big

How the Too Big To Fail Banks Got So Big

The four banks shown above are the four largest banks in the U.S.: JP Morgan Chase, Citi, BofA, and Wells Fargo.  Together they dominate the financial industry. If you add in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the domination is near complete.  They all received large bailouts in the 2008-09 crisis.  Today they are much larger than when we entered the crisis. As the graph shows, none of these banks grew so large by “natural” or “organic” means.  They didn’t grow because they offered better or more efficient services to customers.  They didn’t “win in the marketplace” by competing better.  They simply bought the competition.  It’s domination by merger.  The U.S. banking system which at one time was very competitive and decentralized with literally thousands of very competitive banks is now dominated by a few.  We call it oligopoly on the way to monopoly.

When very, very large banks get too big, they become “Too Big To Fail”.  That means, if the banks were allowed to fail because of bad decisions, bad management, or bad investments, it would set off a domino effect throughout the economy and financial system.  That would punish all of us and not just the bank’s owners.  This, of course, is what happened in 2008 when Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail.  It set off a financial panic where banks wouldn’t / couldn’t loan to each other (or anyone else).  Result:  big bailouts of big banks.

But it doesn’t have to be this way.  Yes, once we have a “too big to fail” bank and it fails, then there’s pretty much no choice but to bail them out.  There are choices about the structure of the bailout. We could have set up the bailouts in a way that the economy wins and the failed managers and bank owners suffered.  We didn’t.  The Federal Reserve, the Bush administration, and then the Obama administration made it a priority to keep the bank managers and bank owners whole.  The economy has suffered from a slow recovery partly as a result.

But bailouts shouldn’t be necessary because we shouldn’t allow the banks to become this big in the first place.  Again, we have a choice.  We could have prevented some or all of these mergers.  The laws are on the books to do it.  Washington, following the failed anti- antitrust philosophy of the Chicago school since the 1980′s simply doesn’t challenge many mergers these days.  It’s bad for campaign contributions.  Besides we’re supposed to believe that a market fairy will make it all right.  Instead of challenging and stopping some of these mergers, both the government and The Federal Reserve have actually facilitated and acted as match-maker for many of the mergers.  In March 2008, when Bear Stearns failed, The Federal Reserve offered a deal to JP Morgan Chase.  If Chase would buy Bear Stearns, The Fed would reimburse Chase for any losses over a set amount.  Heads Chase wins. Tails Chase wins.  Nice deal.

We have other choices as well.  In other industries historically when the private competition in the market led to monopoly or near-monopoly outcomes, the government chose to regulate the industry as a public utility.  We did it in the 1920′s and 1930′s with the electrical industry.  Your local electrical company wasn’t always a regulated utility.  At one time it was ravenous and rapacious private monopoly just like these banks are becoming.  When Standard Oil became a monopoly over a hundred years ago, we sued and broke it up into a bunch of other companies.

This complicity in allowing the big banks to become Too Big To Fail is among the types of policies that the protesters of #OccupyWallStreet want changed.  Me, too.

Obama’s So-Called Keynesian Stimulus Efforts Aren’t Very

The simple version of Keynesian economics suggests that if the economy is suffering from too little economic activity and high unemployment there are some policy options.  Specifically Keynes suggests there are three general kinds of policy options:

  1. The central bank (The Fed in the case of the U.S.) could lower interest rates and create money by buying bonds on the open market.  This is called stimulative monetary policy. It is supposed to work by making private sector borrowing more attractive and more profitable so that businesses in particular increase their spending on business investment goods like equipment and factories.
  2. The government could increase it’s budget deficit by borrowing more money and cutting taxes.  This is fiscal policy by tax cuts. It works by putting more cash in the hands of households and firms (increases their after-tax income) who then increase their spending.
  3. The government could increase it’s budget deficit by borrowing more money and directly spending the money itself, either by direct transfer payments to needy individuals, or by buying things like new dams or construction projects, or by hiring the unemployed itself. This is fiscal policy by spending.

There’s nothing to stop a country from pursuing all the above options simultaneously if it chose.  But not all of these options are equal in either effectiveness.

NOTE: This is old-style John Maynard Keynes style Keynesianism, not the  ”New Keynesian” theories that have dominated some academic circles in the last couple decades. It’s also based on the real thing, not the caricature that it’s opponents paint which is usually without foundation. 

NOTE 2: It’s really not a good idea to try to simplify Keynes.  When you do, you’re likely to over-simplify and really miss powerful insights and nuances.  Nonetheless, I will plunge ahead with full knowledge of the risk.

The real richness of Keynesian theory though lies not just in these prescriptions, but the analysis of when to use which one, whether it is likely to work, and under what conditions.  The first option, monetary policy, is to be preferred in cases of  mild recessions when interest rates are “normal” and the slowdown is largely for mild, temporary factors such as an outside economic shock. Monetary policy is quick and easy to implement. It’s also relatively easy to reverse course when the time comes.

Keynes had two key insights about monetary policy though that are highly relevant to our present situation.  Monetary policy can be become impotent if interest rates drop to near zero and we get into a liquidity trap.  This is when people and firms become fearful of the future and come to expect continued weakness or even GDP declines and deflation.  In a liquidity trap, people just sit on money rather than spend or invest it.  Monetary policy is relatively ineffective in such cases. We have been in a liquidity trap since late 2008 and that’s why the record 3 years of a virtually zero Fed Funds interest rate and The Fed’s QE1 and QE2 programs haven’t worked. Liquidity traps aren’t common, but they do exist and they aren’t extinct.  We were in one in the 1930′s Great Depression and Japan has struggled with one for the last 15+ years.

Keynes also had insights about the two fiscal policy approaches, tax cuts vs. increased spending.   In particular, tax cuts will only be effective to the degree that households and firms actually spend the money.  If they use the money to pay down debts or to save, then it really won’t improve conditions.  Later research in the 1950′s and 1960′s strengthened these insights. Later research showed that it also makes a big difference who gets the tax cuts and whether they think the tax cut is permanent.  Temporary tax cuts are much less effective than permanent ones because people tend to save them more.  Also, high-income individuals tend to save more of the tax cut (proportionally) than more desperate lower-income folks. Finally, later research showed that when a recession comes about because private debt got too high, then tax cuts are least effective.  Notice a pattern here?

The fiscal policy “stimulus” efforts that we have pursued since the Great Recession began have been very, very heavily tax-cut oriented.  Bush’s original stimulus effort in early 2007 in an effort to “nip the recession in the bud” was all tax cuts.  The Feb. 2009 stimulus bill of Obama (the ARRA) was between 40% and 50% tax cuts.  The meager effort passed in Dec 2010 was all tax cuts. And now, the proposal is again very tax cut heavy.  Not only have the fiscal stimulus efforts been heavily tax cut-based, but the cuts have temporary cuts targeted at either high-income folks or only offering a meager amount to low-income folks.  Further, we still have a huge private sector debt overhand that people want to pay down before they spend more. In sum, the dominant response which many have labeled as “Keynesian” really hasn’t been what John Maynard Keynes suggested. Many have asserted that “Keynesian policies don’t work” and cite our weak economy despite several fiscal policy stimulus attempts as proof.  But that’s not really a valid test.  It’s like claiming some physician is a total quack because you took pills like he recommended but you didn’t take the exact same pills as he recommended. You took something else. Now you’re still sick.  It’s not the physician’s prescription that failed, it’s your refusal to follow the prescription and the diagnosis that failed.

Critics will counter with a “yes, but there was still some spending stimulus in the Obama bills and our failure to fully recover is proof the fiscal spending as stimulus prescription is quackery.”  But have we really had an increase in government spending anywhere near large enough to fill the gap?   Let’s look at some trends (courtesy of Brad Delong):

We simply have not expanded government purchases as a share of potential GDP in this downturn:

FRED Graph  St Louis Fed 4

 

The graph shows the relative changes in share of GDP of four key portions of GDP: exports, business equipment investment, government purchases, and residential construction. (everything in the graph is scaled relative to 2005 -that’s why the lines all meet at o in 2005).  The whole Keynesian idea is that if exports, business equipment investment, or residential construction go down then government purchases should go up and vice versa.  That hasn’t happened at all.  Instead, government purchases has consistently declined since 1995!.  In other words, actual changes in government purchases have not only not been a stimulus, but they have been contractionary.  Government spending policy has been contractionary for over 15 years!  We didn’t notice it because strong increases in business equipment investment and housing were doing the stimulating prior to 2006. In the period 1995-2000, it was probably appropriate in a Keynesian sense to have declining government purchases and a contractionary policy – it was countercyclical to the dot-com boom and the housing boom.

But after 2007, residential construction collapsed. For awhile in 2009 both business equipment investment and exports declined sharply.  The only appropriate Keynesian response would have been a very, very large government purchases program.  But we didn’t do that.  Instead, the so-called 2009 stimulus bill was barely enough new spending at the federal level to offset the declines and cuts at the state and local levels. Overall, government spending did not increase. It went neutral for a couple years. But in late 2010, we resumed the march to contractionary policies.  The ARRA wound down.  State and local governments accelerated their budget cuts. And Washington became pre-occupied with imaginary threats of impossible debt crises at some point 10 years from now.

To continue the earlier physician and disease metaphor, we did try a little of the prescription but we took too little.  It’s as if we went to the doctor, the physician diagnosed a very severe infection and prescribed heavy doses of anti-biotics.  We went home took a lot of aspirin instead and only a couple of the anti-biotic tablets.  Now folks want to blame the doctor and his “failed prescriptions” when we didn’t take them.  None of this is what Keynes or 1960′s style Keynesians would have recommended. To conclude that Obama has tried Keynesian policies and they have failed is dead wrong.  The policies have largely failed to stimulate and re-ignite growth, but they weren’t Keynesian.

What a Liquidity Trap Looks Like in Pictures

I want to follow up a little on my discussion of the liquidity trap that we are have been in. Brad Delong has an excellent post today called “Four Years After the Wakeup Call”.  In it he shows some graphs which illustrate very well our the liquidity trap.

Delong first serves us two graphs on the Federal Funds rate since early 2007:

The daily gyrations of the usually-placid Federal Funds market starting in late 2007 told us all that banks were really worried that other banks had jumped the shark and turned themselves insolvent.

FRED Graph  St Louis Fed 7

 

The Federal Funds rate is the interest rate that banks pay to each other when they borrow reserves from each other.  Despite the name, the rate isn’t set by The Fed. It’s set by market supply-and-demand.  It’s a large and brisk market.  When the Fed Funds rate is high (or at least rising), we can infer that banks need and are desperate for reserves, typically because they have profitable opportunities to make loans based on those reserves. When The Fed Funds rate is low and/or dropping, it means that a lot of banks have excess cash on their hands and don’t see any useful or profitable ways to use that money. In other words, a low Fed Funds rate means banks are willing to lend their reserves to other banks because it’s better than nothing and they don’t see any good ways to loan out the money. At the same time, a low rate also shows that few banks are interested in borrowing – again because they don’t see much useful to do with it.  While The Federal Reserve doesn’t set the funds rate, it does set the interest rate for the alternative: direct borrowing from The Fed.

What we see from the first graph is that things were cruising along in early 2007 and then mid- to late 2007 (August to be exact), the rate starts dropping.  We’re moving toward a recession.  Banks are finding it harder to make good loans so they don’t want to borrow more reserves.  Banks start hoarding their cash and assets.  So instead of balance sheets that are full of loans, bonds, and securities, the banks decide they want/need more cash.  Their reserves grow in order to provide a cushion for what was then being seen as the inevitable losses on mortgages and mortgage securities.  Things appear to stablize and then in Sept 2008 comes the Lehman moment.  Fed Funds rate goes virtually to zero.  It’s been stuck there ever since.  Banks have plenty of reserves. They have the cash to lend.  There’s no willingness to lend (banks don’t see many credit-worthy borrowers) and there’s little interest or demand to borrow.

The Federal Reserve has responded during the same period by creating new base money like crazy.  [NOTE: Contrary to the fears of the inflation-fearful crowd, it's not really "money" until it's in circulation with the public. It's only bank reserves - the monetary base.  It creates the ability to create money for the public, but that would necessitate having a bank lend it first. ]  Again Delong shows up graphically just how The Fed has been willing to create new monetary base:

And while the Federal Reserve has taken the monetary base to previously-unimaginable levels–up from $900 billion to $1.7 trillion in late 2008, up to $2 trillion in let 209, and up to $2.7 trillion in early 2011–it has never adopted Milton Friedman’s recommended policy that it start buying bonds for cash and keep buying bonds for cash until nominal spending is on the path that the Federal Reserve wants it to be on:

FRED Graph  St Louis Fed 5

We only need one more graph: GDP.  More precisely a comparison of GDP to an estimate of what GDP could be if we were at full employment and operating at our long-term trend.  Again Delong:

And so right now nominal GDP is $15 trillion/year when it ought to be $16.7 trillion/year:

FRED Graph  St Louis Fed 6

I’ll save inserting the employment graph here.  I’m sure you all know what it looks like. Same story.

And that story is that we had signs of trouble 4 years ago.  Three years ago things went really into the tank.  The economy seriously declined until mid-2009. Ever since then, it’s struggled to hold on.  There really isn’t any recovery.  It’s just going sideways.  We have, in effect, taken a huge chunk of the economy, a huge number of workers, put them on the sideline and said “we’re not interested in you participatin anymore.  We don’t want or need your contribution. We’re happy being smaller”.

So we’ve had monetary stimulus efforts, we’ve had low interest rates, we’ve had the central bank create base money.  There’s plenty of cash out there.  But it’s all in the banks. It’s in deposit accounts. It’s in reserves.  It’s not working. It’s not being used to buy things. It’s not being used for consumption or investment. It’s just sitting around impotent.  That’s a liquidity trap.

Mainstream economic theory, the stuff called “New Classical” or “New Keynesian” (never confuse “New Keynesian” as being “Keynesian”), says keeping interest rates this low for this long would /should fix everything by now.  For over 30 years now, the dominant, orthodox view in the academic and professional world of economists has been that monetary policy exercised by a wise central bank can fix all.  Any weakness in the economy can be solved via lowering interest rates and having the central bank create new bank reserves.  These “modern” theories told us that the concept of a “liquidity trap” was nonsense, a relic of some past era and/or the invention of some crank called Keynes.  These theories claimed that everybody was perfectly rational, all markets (particularly financial markets) were efficient, and uncertainty/risk about the future was unimportant.  They were wrong. We are left with the ideas of the mid-20th century, the stuff that we were told to forget about.  Again Delong:

Four years ago nearly all mainstream economists would have said that, even though the situation appeared serious, by now the economy would be back to normal. …

Very few of us thought that it would be long and nasty…

And as it turned out to be long and nasty, recent economic theories of macroeconomics have fallen like tropical rain forests. The–already implausible–claims that downturns had real causes? Fallen. The claim that downturns lasted only as long as workers misperceived their real wage? Fallen. The claim that the labor market cleared in a small number of years? Fallen. Those of us who believed that the long run came soon, that the cause of downturns was transitory price-level misperceptions, or that downturns had real causes need now to be looking for new jobs, or at least new theories.

And we are left with the live macroeconomic theories being those of the 1960s, at the latest. This is embarrassing for those of us who want to belong to a profession that is a progressive science, rather than an analogue of medieval barbering.

So what would the economic theories of the 1960s and before tell us to do?

  • Milton Friedman: monetary expansion, and more monetary expansion–quantitative easing as deep and as broad as necessary to get nominal GDP back to its trend.
  • John Maynard Keynes (or at least one of the moods of Keynes): have the government borrow and buy stuff, and keep buying stuff until real economic activity is back to some normal trend value.
  • Jacob Viner: Why choose? Do both! Print lots of money and have the government use it to buy stuff and hire people.

The odd thing is that none of those three recommended policies–all of which are sponsored by economists with the purest of purebred pedigrees–have been followed.

It’s time to do two things.  At the policy level we need to go back and try the policies that we understood back in the 50′s and 60′s (economy did pretty well back then, BTW).  Some serious, bold attempts at effective government spending would be nice instead of the weak, too-small, too-timid, niggling efforts dominated by tax cuts we’ve been doing.  And even on the monetary front, it would be more useful to do as Friedman suggested: actually have The Fed keep buying bonds for cash (real circulating money instead of just bank reserves) and keep it up until people start spending it.

On the economics side, we need to get past the perfect rationality and rational expectations stuff (and it’s absurd mathematics) that has dominated the profession.  It would be a good idea to take a more serious look at the heterodox ideas and theories that actually did foresee the crash, the ones based upon realistic models of human behavior and models instead of the perfectly rational, knows-the-future home economicus of the New Classical and New Keynesian models.  We need to seriously look at ideas of Modern Monetary Theorists (MMT), Minsky, the Post-Keynesians, and the behavioral economists.

 

 

Where Are or Were The Jobs?

With the all the alleged concern in Washington now from both parties about job creation, there’s something that’s missing in much of the debate: facts.  So let’s take a look at some.  I really like graphics like the one below.  They’re complex and take quite some time to read and fully absorb what’s there, but they pack a lot of information into a small space.  They’re info-dense.

We hear from the left a lot of talk about “good” vs. “bad” jobs.  Often what they are referring to is the relative wage level of the jobs.  In general, manufacturing and government jobs are “good” because they tend to have slightly higher than average wages*.  Education and health services jobs are a mixed bag with a lot of variation.  Doctors, nurses, and admins do very well.  Home health aides and assisted living workers not so much.  Teachers are either good or bad depending on the state. Leisure and hospitality are generally panned as below-average.

From the right we hear claims that heavily unionized sectors like motor vehicles, parts and manufacturing are holding down growth and killing jobs.  We also hear political conservatives claiming that excessive growth of the government sector has somehow prevented the private sector from adding jobs.

We also hear from the left that it’s lack of demand that is keeping unemployment high.  The right like to claim the unemployment is structural – we have the wrong workforce with the wrong skills.

But what’s really happened?  How have the different policies of Bush and Obama (to the degree they’re different – they aren’t as different as some think) affected the employment picture?  Let’s look a this graph from David Altig, Senior VP at the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank as posted at macroblog.  It helps to click and enlarge the graph in a new window/tab.

Click to Enlarge

First, let’s examine how the graph is structured.  As always, it’s important to make sure we understand a graph’s axes first.  Horizontally, we have the average monthly change in employment in percentage between Dec. 2001 and Oct. 2007.  This period covers all of the non-recession portion of the G.W. Bush administration.  Industries to the reader’s right grew strongly and thrived under the Bush administration’s policies.  Industries to the reader’s left shrunk. No growth is the zero or mid-line. Next, the vertical axis shows a similar measure, average monthly percent increase in employment, but it’s for the period of July 2009 through Aug. 2011.  This is the non-recessionary months of the Obama administration.  Industries located high up grew under the Obama recovery. Industries low on the scale shrunk and cut jobs during Obama’s recovery.  There’s no tricks here of cherry-picking time periods – both axes cover only the “recovery” portion of each president’s respective time in office.

So looking overall, we have the four quadrants.  The upper right shows industries that have added jobs under both presidents’ recoveries. The lower left are industries that have been cutting jobs under both presidents. Upper left would be winners under Obama but not Bush. Lower right are those sectors that have been cutting employment under Obama but were big growth sectors under Bush.  Finally, the size of each bubble indicates the relative importance of the industry in terms of jobs.

So what can we conclude?  First there are few items that aren’t so surprising.

  • Under Bush, a lot of the employment growth involved construction and financial activities.  Not surprising. This is the Wall Street driven housing and mortgage bubble. Frankly we don’t need that big of construction sector, at least not if it’s focused on housing as it was.  We have too much housing already.  We do have needs for more construction of infrastructure and to the degree that housing construction workers are either in the wrong location or don’t have the skills for infrastructure construction (I don’t know – it’s not my expertise), then the low employment growth under Obama here represents a  structural unemployment problem.  But notice that industry isn’t that big.  Also, we probably don’t want to have Financial Activities come back as big as they were before.
  • The big winners under Bush were Education and Health Services and Professional/Business Services.  In education and health, health dominated.  Not surprising, health care spending has been growing and the population is becoming older and/or sicker.   The growth in professional/business services is probably not really very productive stuff.  A very, very large part of the increase in that area was the huge increase in security personnel and related-security contracting that has arisen from an increasing paranoid insecure society since 9/11.
But there are some items here which are surprising, or at least surprising if you’re believe the normal political rhetoric.
  • First, it was Bush who grew government employment.  Under Obama, government employment has been negative since the recession ended. Shrinking government employment is clearly the single largest drag on the economy. That’s not ideology or belief talking. It’s facts and data.
  • Second, the big reason why the Bush recovery was such a slow recovery for employment, considering the 2001 recession was mild, is that throughout the Bush administration manufacturing shrunk dramatically.  This was the result of globalization policies that provided incentives for U.S. manufacturing firms to locate production overseas or to buy from overseas manufacturers instead of making their own.  Fast growing companies like Apple and other computer companies prefer to design it themselves but to contract with foreign firms for manufacture. Obama has not turned the corner on manufacturing employment, but he has stopped the bleeding. For the U.S. to recover, this sector needs to have positive growth.  Given it’s size, it’s not necessary to rise to the top in percentage terms, but it needs to be positive which it isn’t now.
  • “Manufacturing” does not mean “autos”.  Manufacturing is much worse than Motor Vehicles and Parts.  Too often when politicians talk “manufacturing” they conjure a stereotypical image of auto manufacturing.  In reality, motor vehicles and parts, while not being a source of growth under either, has essentially held it’s own as neutral.
  • The Information industry is the one industry that has shrunk under both recoveries, although it’s not that large.  This largely represents true sectoral, innovation-driven change as the World Wide Web changes information technology.
Finally, let’s see what this graph says about the controversy over is unemployment structural (in which case we need training and incentives to work) or is it a lack of aggregate demand (in which case we need more stimulus spending).  I think the graph is relatively clear in this regard.  We have three very, very large sectors where there is no increase in employment under the current recovery: Manufacturing, Retail Trade, and Wholesale Trade.  These are the three that represent basic total spending.  Retail and wholesale trade are driven by total consumer spending. Period. Retail and wholesale also are very flexible without widespread specialized skills requirements.  When demand exists, they hire. When demand doesn’t exist they don’t hire and may layoff.  To me, the data indicates it’s clearly a lack of demand story that is hurting jobs in this so-called recovery. Reducing government employment right now, like this graph shows is being done, has repercussions in stopping employment growth in retail, wholesale, and manufacturing.

Politics and Job-Creation Policies – Disagreements and The Theories Behind Them

Blogging time has been in short supply lately.  To compound things, I’ve had a bunch of inter-woven ideas bouncing around in my head that I want to explain, but  I’ve been struggling to figure out how to do it.  I’ve been stuck in the “can’t explain this until I explain that which in turn needs this explained” circle.  Uggh.  So I’m going to just start taking a shot at it and write some posts that all relate one way or other.

What I want to talk about is why there’s so much disagreement among economists about policies, particularly when it comes to macroeconomic policies.

Few people, regardless of political ideology, dispute the idea that the U.S. economy needs to create more jobs.  It’s obvious to nearly all that persistent unemployment rates over 9% and an economy that month after month fails to create enough net new jobs to keep pace with population growth is problem in need of solution. Likewise, few dispute the idea that the solution will rely upon some sort of policy change.  Even the far-right wing, conservative economists and Austrian school economists argue for policy change. Virtually nobody argues that current policies are ideal.  The issue, then, is how to change policy.  In what direction should policy change so that the government can encourage job creation?

Like many things in political economy, there’s a range or spectrum of recommendations.  I personally don’t like the simple “right vs. left-wing” or “conservative vs. liberal progressive”* terminology. I think things are more complex and positions are richer than that.  But, for purposes of exposition here, I’ll go with it today.

If there are n politicians, there are probably at least n+1 different specific proposals of what to do to change policy to encourage job creation.  But today I’m not looking at specific proposals. Today I want to look at patterns, types, or categories of proposals.  I’m interested in the essence of the logic and economic models/ideas behind the proposals, the thinking that leads people to believe they’ll work.

Right now let’s say there are 4 different categories or generalized views, ranging from what might be called extreme right-wing or libertarian views through conservative views through mildly progressive views and finally a more radical or activist progressive view.  Let’s look at each one, the types of policies advocated and some comments on the economic thinking behind them.  I’ll offer my views afterward.

First, let’s take what we can call the far-conservative view or libertarian (economic libertarian, not necessarily social libertarian).  In the U.S. today, this is represented by the Tea Party positions.  The view here is that it’s  government interference with the free market, private property, and private wealth that causes unemployment in the first place.  Therefore, what’s needed, they argue, is for minimal government with minimalist taxes and as little regulation as possible.  They argue that only the private economy creates jobs at all and that the government cannot by it’s nature create any jobs.  Their proposals will typically take the form of calls for tax cuts, government spending cuts, and repeal of regulations. They will oppose any government programs they see as “welfare” or “redistributionist” such as Social Security or Medicare. Their rhetoric will typically include phrases about “unleashing the private sector”.  In terms of economic theory, supporters of this view find support from what we call Austrian-school economists and the more strict Neo-classical macroeconomists (think University of Chicago school).   These schools of macroeconomics in many ways aren’t about macroeconomics at all.  The theories are heavily based on microeconomics, in particular, the models of pure utility-maximizing rational people interacting in unrestricted markets.  Much of this view in macroeconomics has been called rational expectations schoolefficient markets theory and real business cycle theory.

Next is a the conservative view.  Until the last few years, the milder conservative view was what was espoused mostly by Republican candidates such as both Bushes and Reagan.  In more recent years the Republicans (in general) have moved further toward the far-conservative/libertarian view.  The conservative view is likewise grounded in traditional microeconomic-based neoclassical models.  In many ways, the conservative view is very similar in thinking to the far-conservative libertarian.  They both derive their conclusions from a reliance and embrace of pure-utility maximizing rational micro models of markets.  Both will tend to advocate tax cuts, especially for high-income earners and for corporations. The idea is that high-income earners and corporations would normally create enough new jobs but that taxes discourage them from creating jobs by making business and investment look unprofitable.  The assumption is that if you eliminate or reduce the taxes, investment will naturally look profitable and attractive.  Private sector investment spending will then drive growth in the economy.  This view has also been called supply-side economics. The conservative view typically relies upon rational expectations, efficient markets, and real business cycle theory also, but it also takes a lot from the monetarist views of Milton Friedman and his disciples.

The major point of disagreement between regular conservatives and the far-conservative/libertarian views is really in the area of monetary policy.  Far-conservatives or libertarians dislike central banks (seen as government agencies) and often call for a return to some form of commodity-based money such as gold.  The regular conservative view instead believes that an independent central bank, like the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, if it follows anti-inflation policies, can usually manage monetary policy and interest rates to encourage growth when needed.  In effect, far-conservative/libertarians believe that no type of government or central bank actions can achieve high employment and high growth by policies.  In effect, recessions are simply events we have to live through -they can only be made worse, not better by government policy.  Regular conservative-types favor using monetary policy, in particular interest rates, to manage the economy. And, if monetary policy is ineffective, then they advocate using tax cuts to stimulate the economy.  They have a strong bias against government spending, or at least spending that is used to stimulate the economy (spending for military and wars is usually OK though).

Next we move to views that owe a greater heritage to John Maynard Keynes, though Keynes is far from the only theorist contributing to the views.  We’ll call the next group of policy recommendations Keynesian.  Not surprisingly, this view owes a lot to Keynes.  But Keynesian theory and models have evolved a lot since Keynes’ time.  Some historians of economic thought have argued that, were he alive today, Keynes might not agree with what much of what today’s “Keynesians” argue.  Nonetheless, standard Keynesian models/theories differ from classical/neo-classical/supply-side theories (the ones that conservatives like) in that it focuses on aggregates in the economy like total demand and total spending.  Keynesian models also try to explain why in aggregate, the total economy doesn’t always behave as if it were a simply made of purely rational micro-markets.  Keynesian theory allows for more situations where markets don’t behave rationally all of the time.  Even more significantly, Keynesian theory observes that if we simply assume the economy is the sum of whatever happens in a bunch of micro-markets, we can commit the fallacy of composition.  Keynesian theory points out the cases where the paradox of thrift takes over or when monetary policy is not likely to be effective.

Despite the allegations of many critics, standard Keynesian theory allows for monetary policy to be effective.  But typically standard Keynesian theory says that when the crisis is big or when interest rates are very, very low, then only fiscal policy, increased deficits, will do the job.  Those deficits could be created by either tax cuts or increases in government spending. But, they won’t be equally effective in creating jobs. Basically what’s needed is more spending (demand for goods) in the economy. People need to be motivated to spend more money.  Tax cuts provide money for households and firms to spend, but they do so weakly.  First, people might not spend all the tax cut – they might save some.  Increased savings won’t increase total demand and therefore won’t create the need for new jobs. Further, firms will only spend if they expect future increases in demand.  They won’t spend and invest just because they have more cash in their hands.  Since we have no assurance that a tax cut will result in enough new spending in the economy, Keynesians are more likely to argue for increased government spending because government spending directly creates demand for goods and services.  Contrary to critics’ claims, Keynesian policies are not based upon any ideological desire for socialism or government control.

So what do Keynesian policy proposals for creating more jobs look like?  Increased government spending is the answer.  In particular, while any spending will help, the most desirable forms of spending are public goods, things like infrastructure and schools, and also on social safety nets, things like unemployment compensation, social security, and Medicare. If a proposal calls for more infrastructure spending or extensions/increases in unemployment compensation, it is clearly inspired by theories/models with Keynesian roots.

Finally, there’s proposals that are inspired by the most progressive branches of modern macroeconomics.  Let’s call these proposals the Progressive proposals. Proposals in this area would involve would build upon the ideas of Keynesian group, but go further.  The spending would be greater and on a larger scale. Proposals in this area would call for programs where the government doesn’t just fund projects and buy goods, it actually creates programs that directly hire the unemployed.  Typically such programs are proposed to be temporary or designed in a way to only hire when the private sector won’t (see Bill Mitchell & Randy Wray’s Jobs Guarantee proposals).  These are not socialist or communist proposals.  That’s a whole different thing.  Often Progressive jobs-creation proposals include having the government initiate and fund large-scale infrastructure projects during periods of high unemployment.   This group, which has little popular voice among modern U.S. politicians, is inspired by what’s called Post-Keynesian and Modern Monetary Theories.   In many ways, the original Keynesian proposals for dealing with unemployment are closer to this group than to what we call Keynesian today.  Today’s Keynesians are actually pretty conservative when compared to historical policies.

So there we have it.  Four schools of thought and proposals for how to create jobs in the economy.

Despite the labels attached and misused by politicians, the reality is that the political discussion and policy recommendations of today, the ones with supporters in Congress or the White House, are actually quite conservative.  Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal in the 1930′s was actually rather Progressive.  In the 1950′s, 60′s, and 70′s, the dominant thinking in Washington was Keynesian.  In fact  a”centrist” politically in that era would have still been somewhat Keynesian on our scale above.  In the 1980′s though today, the “center” of mainstream politics has increasingly moved towards conservative thinking.  Today, for example, President Obama is actually pretty conservative.  He is certainly more conservative than the Republican Richard Nixon was in the 1970′s.

Let’s look at the latest proposal from the Obama administration for stimulating the economy to create jobs. It’s actually quite conservative and it’s not very Keynesian at all.  In fact, of the proposed $447 billion effort, less than 1/4 involves more spending for infrastructure or unemployment benefits.  That’s less than 1/4 of the proposal is basic Keynesian.  Instead, it’s overwhelmingly focused on tax cuts and business tax credits/incentives.  These are the policy proposals of a conservative.  Even the original 2009 “stimulus bill” was heavily oriented towards tax cuts and tax incentives.  Despite what critics said, less than half of it was traditional Keynesian stimulus. It’s a sign of how the U.S. political dialogue has shifted towards the conservative/far-conservative end that the Obama proposals have been challenged as “Keynesian” and Obama himself accused of being “socialist”.

* The word “liberal” is particularly problematic. The positions argued by today’s “conservatives” in the U.S. are in fact the positions that were historically identified as “liberal” going back to the 1800′s.  In the 1800′s “liberal” meant anti-government and pro-free market.  Yet, thanks to the power of talk radio and Republican presidential campaigns since the 1980′s, the word liberal has come to be used an epithet to describe opponents of conservatism.  I’ll stick with progressive to label this more left-wing end of the political spectrum to avoid the emotional taint that liberal carries these days.

Founding Fathers Would Have Opposed A Balanced Budget Amendment – The Purpose of National Government Was to Borrow

Both official Washington and the chattering political classes have spent most of the past 12 months debating how to cut the government budget, reduce deficits, and limit debt.  Key groups, and perhaps the most vocal and strident groups in the debate, have been the self-described “constitutional conservatives” and Tea Party types. They have staked out the position that government deficits, debt, and indeed any taxation except the most minimal taxation is un-American and antithetical to “first principles” of the Founding Fathers.  They maintain a myth that the U.S. Constitution was created to limit the U.S. government’s ability to tax or run a deficit.  Unfortunately for them, history and the constitution itself tell a different tale.

Historian William Hogeland punctures the myth that the Founding Fathers would have agreed with today’s Tea Party types using an historian’s favorite tools – the facts. The following originally appeared at New Deal 2.0. Besides the applicability to today’s debates, it makes fascinating reading about the historical situation that led to the Constitution after the Revolution.  (emphasis below in bold are mine)

Why Debt Ceilings and Balanced-Budget Requirements Violate the Original Intent of the Constitution

So-called “constitutional conservatives” ignore the realpolitik of our nation’s origins.

In a critical and entertaining portrait of the anti-tax activist Grover Norquist, the New York Times columnist Frank Bruni presented Norquist as an absolutist obsessed with forcing modern political life to conform to ideas that Norquist associates with the American founders’ first principles.  Of course, Norquist is by no means alone in taking that position. That the Constitution came into existence to keep taxes low, the federal government small, and national debt at zero is an article of faith among many who, like Michele Bachmann, have taken to calling themselves “constitutional conservatives.” And faith is required to believe it, as the Norquist interview shows. To make his supposedly constitutional argument, Norquist cites the first amendment on freedom of religion and the second on the right to keep and bear arms, and then goes on to cite absolutely nothing, in either the articles or the amendments, that so much as hints at a constitutional requirement to balance the federal budget, avoid debt, tax no more than people like Norquist deem appropriate, and keep government small.

He can’t cite anything to that effect because while balancing budgets, restraining borrowing, and keeping taxes low and government small might be good goals, depending on what you mean by them, it is impossible to locate in the founding national law any requirement to accomplish them. Indeed, the reality of founding history leads to the reverse conclusion.

The Constitution came about precisely to enable a newly large government — a national one — to tax all Americans for the specific purpose of funding a large public debt. Neither Alexander Hamilton nor his mentor the financier Robert Morris made any bones about that purpose; James Madison was among their closest allies; and Edmund Randolph of Virginia opened the Constitutional Convention by charging the delegates to redress the country’s failure to fund — not pay off, fund — the public debt, by creating a national government.

Beginning during the War of Independence, and continuing throughout the 1780s, American nationalists committed themselves to a small class of upscale high financiers (largely identical with the American nationalists), who had bought bonds from the confederation Congress in hopes of earning regular, tax-free, 6% interest payments — not in the Congress’s crashing paper currency but in hard, cold metal or its equivalent, stable bills of exchange. Morris, Hamilton, Madison, and others believed that swelling the debt to immense proportions would make a coherent nation out of thirteen squabbling states and make that nation a player on the world economic stage. Their plan to do so depended partly on making military-officer pay a pension, thus turning the entire officer class into public bondholders — and giving Congress new power to tax all Americans to support that debt.

Hamilton is often reflexively presented as finding inventive ways to pay down the national debt. His real accomplishments were of course “funding and assumption” — absorbing the states’ war debts in the federal one and funding that huge obligation via nationally collected and nationally enforced taxes.

Hence the all-important provisions of the Constitution giving Congress very broad powers to tax and acquire debt. To 18th-century American nationalists across the political spectrum — to our founders and framers, that is, from Hamilton to Madison, from Morris to Randolph, from the financiers to the planters — national taxing and borrowing were ineluctably connected to the very purpose of national government.

Nobody has to like it. But the original intent of the Constitution involved sustaining and managing public debt via taxation.

Both the articles and the amendments do, of course, limit government and restrict its power. But no ratified amendment has ever qualified Congress’s power of the purse, which in the minds of the framers explicitly involved the power to take on debt and fund it. In their tweets and blogs, “constitutional conservatives” have been promoting a balanced-budget amendment with reference to the tired notion that since households and small businesses must balance their budgets (as if!), government must too. They link that economically useless prescription to the widespread fantasy that our Constitution was written, amended, and ratified for just such a purpose. The framers saw it just the other way.

But really everybody, not just “constitutional conservatives,” buys into the fantasy now. History is rarely helpful politically. It’s hard to imagine liberals bringing to debt-ceiling and balanced-budget debates the painful realpolitik of our national origins, which show the Constitution existing, originally, to finance the investing class and yoke that class’s interest (in every sense) to national power. Thus the Times gives the Bruni piece a headline referring to Norquist’s “dangerous purity” — as if the danger in Norquist’s approach lies in a too-rigid insistence on basic principle. There’s nothing purist about Norquist. Whether his ideas may be proven right or proven wrong, they are anything but originalist. Like those of Bachmann and the rest of the anti-tax right, Norquist’s principles are novel, innovative, and weirdly postmodern, extra-constitutional at best.

Stark realism about the actual founding purposes of the Constitution will always have limited use in political debate. But it would be nice, at least — though unlikely — if we would argue these issues on their merits, and leave the Constitution alone.

William Hogeland is the author of the narrative histories Declaration and The Whiskey Rebellion and a collection of essays, Inventing American History. He has spoken on unexpected connections between history and politics at the National Archives, the Kansas City Public Library, and various corporate and organization events. He blogs at http://www.williamhogeland.com.

The Mean and the Median Tell Two Different Stories

Averages, if you’re not careful, can as easily mislead as enlighten.  It matters a lot which statistical measure of the “average-ness” that’s used.  A good example comes in the case of the U.S. long-term trend of economic growth.  What we’re interested in is to what degree the amount of GDP the average household has available has increased over time.  It’s the prime way economists measure whether not living standards are improving.  GDP, of course, is the measure we use to count output in the economy.  GDP is the total market value of all goods and services produced for final demand in a year.   Real GDP is the inflation-adjusted version of it so we can compare GDP from different years.   But of course, just because total GDP, or even real GDP, is going up from year to year is no assurance that living standards are generally increasing.  After all, if real GDP grows by 1% per year but the population grows by 2% per year, there’s less per mouth each year.

So we need to adjust the real GDP measure to account for population growth. We want a measure of average GDP per person or average GDP per household.  Those readers who didn’t fall asleep in statistics class might recall that technically “average” isn’t a statistical measure.  Instead there are several different ways of calculating what statisticians prefer to call “central tendency” instead of “average”.  The two most common calculations in economics are the mean and median.  And there’s a huge difference between them.  The mean is  what you probably learned in primary school as the “average”.  To calculate it we take the total and divide by the number of people in the population.  When economists cite GDP per capita, we are, in fact, calculating the mean Real GDP per person.  The mean, the real GDP per capita for the U.S. over the last 34 years has grown at around a 1.9% annual rate.  That might not sound like much, but remember the power of compounding means that at 1.9%, mean real GDP per person will double in less than 40 years – one working lifetime.  Sounds good, right?  Sounds like the American dream in action, right? Wrong.

Real GDP per capita when looking at the U.S. is highly misleading because most of the growth only goes to the top 1% income folks.  The vast majority of Americans, the other 99% of us, haven’t experienced anything like that growth.  To see the difference let’s consider real income of the median household.  Remember Gross Domestic Income is the same as Gross Domestic Product.  It’s just counted differently by counting income available to spend instead of actual spending.  Long run, they are the same.  Now let’s quick review what the median is. The median is the middle observation. It means that there’s as many observations with a lesser value as there are with a greater value.  In this context it means that there are exactly as many households with a smaller income as there are households with a larger income.  It’s another way of looking at the average.  In this case we’re looking for the most typical household.  Statistics note:  mean will equal median if both sides of the distribution are identical, but in income this isn’t true – millionaires, billionaires, and rich households are a lot richer than the $49,700 median income but the poorest households can only $49,700 poorer at most.

In the U.S. over the last 34 years, the median household income has only grown at less than 0.5% per year despite increases in education.  So real GDP per person grows at 1.9% per year, but real median income only grows less than 0.5% per year.  At 0.5%, it will take 150 years for income to double.  End of the American dream of doing a lot better than your parents. What accounts for the difference?  It’s the upper 1% of the income distribution, the rich folks, millionaires and billionaires, that have skimmed off the 65% of all of the GDP gains for 34 years.

Princeton economics professor Uwe Reinhardt explains in the NYTimes Economix blog:

So if an American macroeconomist — a specialist who tends to think of nations as people — or high-level government officials or politicians mimicking a macroeconomist boasted on a television talk show that “average family income grew by 3 percent during 2002-7, more than in most European economies,” about 99 percent of American viewers, reflecting on their own experience, would probably scratch their heads and wonder, “What is this guy talking about?”

The third chart, below, exhibits the growth path of real G.D.P. per capita in the United States over the period 1975-2009 and the corresponding path of real median household income. The data show that over the 34-year period, real G.D.P. per capita rose by an annual compound rate of 1.9 percent. Those data come from the Economic Report of the President to the Congress (Tables B-2 and B-34).

Sources: Economic Report of the President to Congress (G.D.P.); Census Bureau (income)

According to the Census Bureau data (see Table H-6), however, median household income in the United States rose by less than 0.5 percent a year. Other than national pride in league tables, that 1.9 percent average economic growth does not mean much for the experience of the median household in the United States.

State and Local Job Cuts are Accelerating, Making the Economy Worse and Cutting Education

Nicholas Johnson at the Center on Budget and Policy Studies explains how state and local governments are cutting jobs and how a majority of those jobs lost are education jobs.

September 2, 2011 at 1:24 pm

Three Years of State and Local Jobs CutsToday’s jobs report shows that in August, cuts by states and local governments — especially school districts — wiped out private-sector job gains.

The state and local sector cut 15,000 jobs in August.  That comes on top of a whopping 66,000 jobs lost in July, according to revised figures released today — the worst single month of job loss for states and localities since the recession began in December 2007.  States and localities have eliminated 671,000 jobs since employment peaked in August 2008 (see first graph).

Not coincidentally, July was also the first month of the new fiscal year for most states, one in which they are facing the double-whammy of weak revenues (which remain well below pre-recession levels) and the expiration of temporary federal aid.

Three Years of School Job CutsSome 14,000 of the state and local jobs lost in August were in local school districts, bringing to 293,000 the total decline in school-district employment since August 2008 (see second graph).

Cuts in state education funding are a big reason behind these education-related job losses.  As we reported yesterday, the vast majority of states for which data are available are cutting basic education grants to local school districts to below pre-recession levels.  Some of the cuts exceed 20 percent.

These troubling numbers raise a disconcerting question:  What kind of an economic future will this country have if we keep cutting education?

Jobs And Unemployment Report For August 2011 – More Bad News, More Signs Economy Is Stalled, No Net New Jobs

This being the first Friday of the month, the latest U.S. employment report was released this morning.  Not good news.  In a nutshell:  no new net jobs created and the unemployment rate holds steady at 9.1%. It disappointed even the weak expectations of forecasters. The news continues to show an economy that has stalled without recovering and is in danger of relapsing to recession. CalculatedRiskBlog does it’s usual exemplary reporting of the latest monthly jobs and unemployment report:

From the BLS:

Nonfarm payroll employment was unchanged (0) in August, and the unemployment rate held at 9.1 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Employment in most major industries changed little over the month. Health care continued to add jobs, and a decline in information employment reflected a strike. Government employment continued to trend down, despite the return of workers from a partial government shutdown in Minnesota.

The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for June was revised from
+46,000 to +20,000, and the change for July was revised from +117,000 to +85,000.

The following graph shows the employment population ratio, the participation rate, and the unemployment rate.

Employment Pop Ratio, participation and unemployment ratesClick on graph for larger image in graph gallery.

The unemployment rate was unchanged at 9.1% (red line).

When looking at the detailed numbers we find that the private sector created a net total of 17,000 new jobs.  Unfortunately this was entirely offset by government reducing employment by 17,000 jobs.  I suppose for Tea Party and Conservative types who blame government for most all economic ills and who fantasize about a society with no government, this is moving towards their ideal economy.  Somehow, I don’t see it that way.

Further details behind the numbers show that the number of private sector jobs was likely understated by 45,000 since during the survey week the 45,000 Verizon workers who were on strike were not counted as having jobs.  Those jobs will return in the report on September, assuming Verizon doesn’t lay off some of them.

Overall, the picture for recovering from the Great Recession has been turning bleaker.  We were never on a very robust path for recovery at all during the last 2 years.  However, now what modest slow momentum we had towards job recovery has stalled and job recovery has essentially flatlined.  At the current rate, we never recover the jobs lost in 2008-09 until at least a decade has passed, if that.  This is definitely starting to look like depression territory, not “recession”.  The following graph, also from Calculated Risk,


Percent Job Losses During Recessions

The second graph shows the job losses from the start of the employment recession, in percentage terms. The dotted line is ex-Census hiring.

The red line is moving sideways – and I’ll need to expand the graph soon.

The current employment recession is by far the worst recession since WWII in percentage terms, and 2nd worst in terms of the unemploymentrate (only the early ’80s recession with a peak of 10.8 percent was worse).

The details in the report also show more depressing (sorry for the pun) news:

  • U-6, an alternate unemployment rate measure that includes both traditional unemployed (no job but looking), part-time workers who want but can’t full-time hours, and some other marginally-attached workers has risen to 16.2%, a new high for this year.
  • There are 13.967 million Americans unemployed now.
  • Of those unemployed workers, 6.0 million have been without a job and looking for work for over 6 months.
  • The previous reported totals for both June and July were revised downward.