David McWilliams Explains Why Austerity Is Doomed In Europe

A very interesting video by an Irish economist explaining how the current reduce government spending (“austerity”) approach to the Eurozone debt and currency crisis is doomed to fail. It is doomed because cutting government spending in a recession only makes the recession worse, which in turn, reduces tax collections which then makes the government deficits worse not better.  But not only is the austerity approach all wrong to solving the debt crisis, it carries very significant risk of social upheaval.  (hat tip to Philip Pilkington and New Economic Perspectives).

Now I’ll offer one pre-emptive comment.  Critics of the arguments McWilliams makes often claim that either government spending isn’t really effective, that somehow only private investment spending will stimulate an economy.  Or, the critics claim that any resources the government puts into use through spending actually detract from the economy by denying those resources to some supposedly better, privately chosen use. Both of these criticism fail.  We are clearly discussing a situation in which there are excess, unused economic resources in the economy.  In plain language:  there’s high unemployment and people are out of work.  The criticisms are all based on an idea called “crowding out”.  For crowding out to occur, the economy must be at full employment – the opposite of being in a recession.

Does Anybody Understand Debt?

Does anybody understand debt?  Some – but not many.  Today’s post is less of my normal extended prose and more of an outline.  I’ve been invited to speak at some writing classes here at the college and this is intended to serve as my speaking notes.


Background: What have you heard?

Krugman in New York Times

Harvey in Forbes

Background Info on U.S. National Debt

Brazelton:  The US CANNOT Go Broke


Numbers, Metaphors, and Stories


Get the terms right

Debt, Deficit, and tr/b/m-illions

$1,000,000,000,000

$1,000,000,000

$1,000,000

$1 trillion =  1 million times $1 million

Debt


Deficit

1984-present U.S. Federal Budget


Measuring the Debt

Counting Absolute Dollars of Debt Deceives. It's All Relative.


Three Bad Metaphors


Government is NOT a Household

Government is NOT like a Household!

Econproph: Once Again, Government is Not Like  a Household


 Govt Debt is NOT a Burden on future generations


Private Debt is NOT like Government Debt

Federal Reserve Breakdown of Household Debt

Foreigners Don’t Control


So…

A Sovereign Government Cannot “Go Broke”


Eurozone Countries Can “Go Broke”


Government Debt is Like Money that Pays Interest


But What About Inflation?  Printing money?

Inflation involves real demand vs. real supply, not just $


Test on Debt:  Interest Rates

Rates are historically low and staying low.


Are Gov. Deficits Necessary?

Yes, if you want to save money.

Forever?   Yes.

Econproph: But What About National Debt-to-GDP Ratio? Not a Problem, Really


Are There Limits to Deficits?

Yes, but related to full employment and capacity.


In Practice, Nobody Understands Money.

Well they understand yesterday’s money, not modern money.

That’s why they don’t understand debt.

Rhetoric Is A Powerful Tool To Advance Moneyed Interests

Money is essential to a successful economy.  But it’s money in circulation that’s useful.  Money that’s locked up in storage in vaults and savings doesn’t help.  The early economists understood this well and often used the analogy of money-is-to-economy as blood-is-to-human-body.  Circulating money, money that is used to buy things is as important to the economy as the blood in your arteries and veins.  The analogy works.  It leads us to realize that money, and more of it, can and usually is a good thing.

The analogy, however, doesn’t work for those economists and policy-makers who want are more interested in enabling the top 1% or so to profit at no risk by earning income on holding money.  Theoretically, the rich, the top 1%, could earn income from their large stores of wealth by investing it in production.  But the profit-by-investment-in-production method requires risk. It’s hard. It requires work to find and exploit good investment opportunities. From the perspective of the really wealthy, it can be more desirable to make money by simply owning money.  To do that, it’s necessary to that there be no inflation. They actually prefer deflation because then their cash wealth gets more valuable without being risked or used productively at all. The other approach to making money without risk by simply owning money is to lend it. Instead of starting, owning, and building a business, investing in equity, you make loans. Ideally you use your wealth and influence to get politicians to guarantee your loans – heads you win and tails somebody else loses. These approaches to making money by simply owning money require that money be scarce and hard to get.  It’s directly counter to the money in circulation paradigm.  A circulatory system deprived of money is good thing those who make money from money instead of labor.

But to persuade the mass of people, the 99%, the ones earning money from labor, it’s necessary to change the metaphor.  That’s been rather effectively in the second half of the 20th century.  It’s been done by extending a different metaphor.  Economists have long used the word liquidity for the idea of how easy it is to convert an asset into cash and therefore spent. For example, real estate (particularly in this market) is very illiquid.  I could own a $1 million house but be unable to buy a Coke from the 7-11 store because I lack any cash.  That’s an extreme example of illiquidity.  In contrast, a liquid asset is one that is either actually cash or easily turned into cash so it can be spent.  There’s a whole range of assets in between with varying degrees of liquidity.

This idea of liquidity and it’s association with cash has been used to push a metaphor that suggests the problem is too much money in the economy.  We’re peppered with phrases like “drowning in debt” or a house mortgage that is “underwater”.  It makes us feel that the liquid stuff is undesirable.  So we get  a central bank that’s reluctant to create and inject money into the economy because critics claim that will create too much liquidity and they falsely claim that it’s inflationary.  When the central bank does increase inject liquidity into the economy, it does it by getting the money to precisely the people who keep it from circulating.  We get a government that refuses to use it’s ability to directly inject money into the economy and get it into circulation.

Government ultimately is the source of all money.  Only government can define and create money.  It has two ways to do it. It can simply create (“print” or “mint” if you will, but it’s not that way anymore) money and spend it.  That puts money immediately into circulation in the circular flow of goods and services.  Or, the government could create money reserves for the banks, a riskier strategy.  The banks then can lend using a fractional reserve logic.  If the banks lend out the reserves, then money is created.  If the borrowers from the banks spend the borrowed money, then it’s in circulation.  If the borrowers use the money to simply buy other financial assets, then it’s not in circulation and is sterile.

In our modern system, the government (in the U.S. and many other nations) has delegated the responsibility for creating money and putting it into circulation to quasi-private central banks such as The Federal Reserve Bank.  In today’s workings of the financial system, these central banks have further delegated the responsibility and decision-making on money-creation to private commercial banks by providing reserves for whatever level of loans they choose.  When those banks choose not to create money or choose not to create and provide money in a way that puts it into circulation, the system suffers. We suffer from too little liquidity.

Daniel Becker at Angry Bear made this point very well in a long post there in June 2011.  He points out that we should really talk about “dehydrating in debt”, not “drowing in debt”.  The dehydration metaphor leads us directly to the solution – more money in circulation.  I from the conclusion to his post:

Got that? Let’s summarize: The share of income to the 99% of people declined from 1976 onward. At the same time the means of making money changed from labor production to money manipulation (producer economy to finanicialized economy) adding to the reduction in share of income. We also changed the ideology to one from relying on the vast population (as represented by the individual and We the People) to relying on a small portion of the population to distribute what money was created. We did this for 33 years. By 1996, people were borrowing as a means to sustain their standard of living (not increase it). If the people are not spending to increase their standard of living, then is the economy really growing? By 2006 people were no longer able to make the payments and consumption was declining.  Then gas hit $4/gal and winter heating was looking like another $4000 to $6000 would be needed.

To date, nothing has been done to address this. Nothing at all. And, by “this” I mean, the income inequality that has resulted in an an economy where a very small group of people (top 1%) are taking money out of the system (that is money that would fuel the engine) faster than the engine can make it which results in an ever faster declining share to the rest of the people. Instead, we have refined new fuel and dumped it right into the top 1%’s hands and wonder why the engine is still sputtering?

One other issue I have with framing and the words used today: Under water.

People are not under water. They are not drowning in debt. On the contrary, people are dehydrating. They are starving for water. Do you know what the symptoms are of dehydration? You get thirsty and then urinate less to conserve water. (debt spending) Then you stop making tears and stop sweating. (can’t borrow) Eventually your muscles cramp, the heart palpitates and you get dizzy. (close to bankruptcy, voting against your interest) Let it go long enough and you get confused, weak and your coping mechanisms fail. (Tea Party, etc) In the end, your systems fail and you die. (recession)

People are dehydrating and Washington is doing nothing about it because they believe it is drowning.  They are throwing out life boats to people in a desert.  That is the chart Ken linked to.

Oligopoly and the Costs of Higher Education – Journals Edition

There are many reasons why costs in higher education have been rising faster than inflation for many decades.  A fundamental reason is because education is so labor-intensive and (so far) has been resistant to improved productivity via capital investment or technology.  This is called Baumol’s Cost Disease.

But there are other reasons too.  One is that historically higher education has been a non-profit industry but it is like healthcare in that much, if not all, of the costs are paid for by a third-party such as government instead of the consuming customer themselves.  There’s another similarity to healthcare in that in both it’s the seller, the doctor or the professor/university, that tells the consumer, the patient or student, what specifically they need to consume.  The consuming customer, the student or patient, doesn’t have all the information to know what they need.  This 3-way or 4-way transaction arrangement isn’t the standard buyer-seller arrangement of micro-economic texts about markets.  When a 3-way arrangement exists where there’s a seller, a consumer and a separate payor, conditions are ripe for abuse.  Basically, the seller tells the consumer to buy more at higher prices.  The consumer doesn’t object because somebody else is paying.

Historically, the arrangements never got out of hand because doctors in healthcare and universities in higher education were non-profit “professionals”.  But when for-profit entities entered, the dynamics shifted.  Higher education still consists of a a strong majority of non-profit institutions.  But they are surrounded by a several supplier industries that are very definitely profit-maximizers such as book publishers.  Publishers have long pursued a process of competing on features and making textbooks more expensive because the person who selected the book, the professor, didn’t have to pay.  Students paid through their student loans and they didn’t have much choice.

Eliminating choice is the key to higher profits.  That’s why monopolies and oligopolies make economic profits while firms in pure price competition don’t.

Now courtesy of a lecture by Hal Abelson at the Educause 2011 conference, passed our way by George Siemens at elearnspace.org, we see why prices of academic journals have risen so much that many libraries can’t afford them.  It’s the trend towards concentration and oligopoly.  The government could do something about it via antitrust enforcement, but for several decades antitrust enforcement has been weak except for blatant conspiratorial price-fixing.  This image below (from this article – .pdf) demonstrates:

Too Big to Fail Should Be Too Big to Exist

Against Monopoly has a great graphic that shows a big part of the problem with our financial sector and our economy.

How the Too Big to Fail Banks Got  So Big

How the Too Big To Fail Banks Got So Big

The four banks shown above are the four largest banks in the U.S.: JP Morgan Chase, Citi, BofA, and Wells Fargo.  Together they dominate the financial industry. If you add in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the domination is near complete.  They all received large bailouts in the 2008-09 crisis.  Today they are much larger than when we entered the crisis. As the graph shows, none of these banks grew so large by “natural” or “organic” means.  They didn’t grow because they offered better or more efficient services to customers.  They didn’t “win in the marketplace” by competing better.  They simply bought the competition.  It’s domination by merger.  The U.S. banking system which at one time was very competitive and decentralized with literally thousands of very competitive banks is now dominated by a few.  We call it oligopoly on the way to monopoly.

When very, very large banks get too big, they become “Too Big To Fail”.  That means, if the banks were allowed to fail because of bad decisions, bad management, or bad investments, it would set off a domino effect throughout the economy and financial system.  That would punish all of us and not just the bank’s owners.  This, of course, is what happened in 2008 when Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail.  It set off a financial panic where banks wouldn’t / couldn’t loan to each other (or anyone else).  Result:  big bailouts of big banks.

But it doesn’t have to be this way.  Yes, once we have a “too big to fail” bank and it fails, then there’s pretty much no choice but to bail them out.  There are choices about the structure of the bailout. We could have set up the bailouts in a way that the economy wins and the failed managers and bank owners suffered.  We didn’t.  The Federal Reserve, the Bush administration, and then the Obama administration made it a priority to keep the bank managers and bank owners whole.  The economy has suffered from a slow recovery partly as a result.

But bailouts shouldn’t be necessary because we shouldn’t allow the banks to become this big in the first place.  Again, we have a choice.  We could have prevented some or all of these mergers.  The laws are on the books to do it.  Washington, following the failed anti- antitrust philosophy of the Chicago school since the 1980′s simply doesn’t challenge many mergers these days.  It’s bad for campaign contributions.  Besides we’re supposed to believe that a market fairy will make it all right.  Instead of challenging and stopping some of these mergers, both the government and The Federal Reserve have actually facilitated and acted as match-maker for many of the mergers.  In March 2008, when Bear Stearns failed, The Federal Reserve offered a deal to JP Morgan Chase.  If Chase would buy Bear Stearns, The Fed would reimburse Chase for any losses over a set amount.  Heads Chase wins. Tails Chase wins.  Nice deal.

We have other choices as well.  In other industries historically when the private competition in the market led to monopoly or near-monopoly outcomes, the government chose to regulate the industry as a public utility.  We did it in the 1920′s and 1930′s with the electrical industry.  Your local electrical company wasn’t always a regulated utility.  At one time it was ravenous and rapacious private monopoly just like these banks are becoming.  When Standard Oil became a monopoly over a hundred years ago, we sued and broke it up into a bunch of other companies.

This complicity in allowing the big banks to become Too Big To Fail is among the types of policies that the protesters of #OccupyWallStreet want changed.  Me, too.

UPDATE on President Obama’s Jobs Proposal – Better, But Still Weak

First an update on a post I made a few days ago. When I commented last Monday on President Obama’s jobs proposal, I was less than excited. Having read more detail of the proposal, I should correct some statements I made.  I incorrectly left the impression that the payroll tax (Social Security/Medicare tax) cut that the President was proposing was only an extension of the present year cut that is scheduled to expire December 31, 2011.

In fact, the President is proposing not only a 1 year extension of this year’s temporary payroll tax cut, but an increase in the size of that tax cut.  Estimates are that for a median household income of near $50,000, it would result in a $1,500 reduction in payroll taxes compared to not having any payroll tax cut at all. However, the existing, this-year only, payroll tax cut had already cut payroll taxes by up to $500 per household.  So of the claimed $1,500 tax cut for next year for the median household, $500 is an extension of this year’s situation and  $1000 is new stimulus.  Today’s economy is weak even with the existing temporary $500 tax cut, so extending that cut won’t improve things. It will only prevent things from deteriorating further.  In my world, simply agreeing to not put on the brakes is not the same thing as actually hitting the accelerator.

But, the proposal does contain perhaps $1000 worth of tax cut stimulus to nearly all working households. That’s perhaps $150 billion of pure, new stimulus to economy.  It’s more than I estimated on Monday, so the plan will likely have some more stimulative effects than I thought.  But how much?  Let’s do a quick “back of the envelope” type calculation.  The proposal puts $150 billion in consumers’ hands that wouldn’t have been there without it.  But for this money to generate jobs, people have to spend the money.  Simply saving the money or paying down debt won’t cut it.  That improves individual household balance sheets but it doesn’t cause any firm out there to go “oh, more business! I need to hire people!”  In normal times like the 1960′s or 1970′s people would have spent 85-90% of the tax cut.  But these aren’t normal times. We live in high debt, high debt payments, and scared-of-the-future times.  More people save in these kind of times. (paying down debt is economically the same as savings – think of your debt as a negative balance in a savings account).  Let’s assume that people spend 2/3 of the money.  Both history and theory indicate that people save more of a tax cut when they know it’s temporary, but let’s be generous/optimistic and say 2/3 gets spent.  That’s $100 billion in new spending.

Now when it gets spent, it generates business demand and jobs.  Those people get paid and then they go spend the money again – the circular flow of money in the economy.  How much?  That’s a huge controversy in empirical macroeconomics.  This is the question of what the spending multiplier is.  Estimates vary widely, although often the studies are heavily biased by ideology to begin with.  Let’s be modestly optimistic and say the multiplier is 1.5 – 2.0.  This is a relatively high estimate given recent studies as far as I know, but let’s run with it.  That means that after some months, this initial $150 billion in tax cuts becomes $100 billion in new, initial spending which ultimately increases total spending by $150-$200 billion.  Total spending is another way of saying GDP.  This puts it in the range of 1.0% to 1.5% of GDP.

There’s a rule of thumb about the relationship between changes in GDP to changes in unemployment rate. It’s called Okun’s Law.  It’s not a law so much as a statistical regularity. There are many versions, but let’s use a real simple one: each 2 percentage point change in GDP equates to a 1 percentage point change in the unemployment rate.  So if we have GDP growth increasing by 1.5% points, we can count on unemployment rate going down by 0.75 to 1.0% points.

We’re currently over 9% unemployment rate and stuck there.  I’m not real excited about a proposal that aims to reduce the unemployment rate from over 9% to maybe 8%.  We know 4-5% unemployment is possible.  We did it in 2006 even with the slow-growth policies of the Bush administration.  We did better than that under Clinton. In the 1960′s we were even below 4%.   Why are we settling for tepid responses and setting goals of only getting to 8% unemployment and then calling this “bold”?  I don’t know.  But then maybe I’m just a grumpy old man.

Politics and Job-Creation Policies – Disagreements and The Theories Behind Them

Blogging time has been in short supply lately.  To compound things, I’ve had a bunch of inter-woven ideas bouncing around in my head that I want to explain, but  I’ve been struggling to figure out how to do it.  I’ve been stuck in the “can’t explain this until I explain that which in turn needs this explained” circle.  Uggh.  So I’m going to just start taking a shot at it and write some posts that all relate one way or other.

What I want to talk about is why there’s so much disagreement among economists about policies, particularly when it comes to macroeconomic policies.

Few people, regardless of political ideology, dispute the idea that the U.S. economy needs to create more jobs.  It’s obvious to nearly all that persistent unemployment rates over 9% and an economy that month after month fails to create enough net new jobs to keep pace with population growth is problem in need of solution. Likewise, few dispute the idea that the solution will rely upon some sort of policy change.  Even the far-right wing, conservative economists and Austrian school economists argue for policy change. Virtually nobody argues that current policies are ideal.  The issue, then, is how to change policy.  In what direction should policy change so that the government can encourage job creation?

Like many things in political economy, there’s a range or spectrum of recommendations.  I personally don’t like the simple “right vs. left-wing” or “conservative vs. liberal progressive”* terminology. I think things are more complex and positions are richer than that.  But, for purposes of exposition here, I’ll go with it today.

If there are n politicians, there are probably at least n+1 different specific proposals of what to do to change policy to encourage job creation.  But today I’m not looking at specific proposals. Today I want to look at patterns, types, or categories of proposals.  I’m interested in the essence of the logic and economic models/ideas behind the proposals, the thinking that leads people to believe they’ll work.

Right now let’s say there are 4 different categories or generalized views, ranging from what might be called extreme right-wing or libertarian views through conservative views through mildly progressive views and finally a more radical or activist progressive view.  Let’s look at each one, the types of policies advocated and some comments on the economic thinking behind them.  I’ll offer my views afterward.

First, let’s take what we can call the far-conservative view or libertarian (economic libertarian, not necessarily social libertarian).  In the U.S. today, this is represented by the Tea Party positions.  The view here is that it’s  government interference with the free market, private property, and private wealth that causes unemployment in the first place.  Therefore, what’s needed, they argue, is for minimal government with minimalist taxes and as little regulation as possible.  They argue that only the private economy creates jobs at all and that the government cannot by it’s nature create any jobs.  Their proposals will typically take the form of calls for tax cuts, government spending cuts, and repeal of regulations. They will oppose any government programs they see as “welfare” or “redistributionist” such as Social Security or Medicare. Their rhetoric will typically include phrases about “unleashing the private sector”.  In terms of economic theory, supporters of this view find support from what we call Austrian-school economists and the more strict Neo-classical macroeconomists (think University of Chicago school).   These schools of macroeconomics in many ways aren’t about macroeconomics at all.  The theories are heavily based on microeconomics, in particular, the models of pure utility-maximizing rational people interacting in unrestricted markets.  Much of this view in macroeconomics has been called rational expectations schoolefficient markets theory and real business cycle theory.

Next is a the conservative view.  Until the last few years, the milder conservative view was what was espoused mostly by Republican candidates such as both Bushes and Reagan.  In more recent years the Republicans (in general) have moved further toward the far-conservative/libertarian view.  The conservative view is likewise grounded in traditional microeconomic-based neoclassical models.  In many ways, the conservative view is very similar in thinking to the far-conservative libertarian.  They both derive their conclusions from a reliance and embrace of pure-utility maximizing rational micro models of markets.  Both will tend to advocate tax cuts, especially for high-income earners and for corporations. The idea is that high-income earners and corporations would normally create enough new jobs but that taxes discourage them from creating jobs by making business and investment look unprofitable.  The assumption is that if you eliminate or reduce the taxes, investment will naturally look profitable and attractive.  Private sector investment spending will then drive growth in the economy.  This view has also been called supply-side economics. The conservative view typically relies upon rational expectations, efficient markets, and real business cycle theory also, but it also takes a lot from the monetarist views of Milton Friedman and his disciples.

The major point of disagreement between regular conservatives and the far-conservative/libertarian views is really in the area of monetary policy.  Far-conservatives or libertarians dislike central banks (seen as government agencies) and often call for a return to some form of commodity-based money such as gold.  The regular conservative view instead believes that an independent central bank, like the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, if it follows anti-inflation policies, can usually manage monetary policy and interest rates to encourage growth when needed.  In effect, far-conservative/libertarians believe that no type of government or central bank actions can achieve high employment and high growth by policies.  In effect, recessions are simply events we have to live through -they can only be made worse, not better by government policy.  Regular conservative-types favor using monetary policy, in particular interest rates, to manage the economy. And, if monetary policy is ineffective, then they advocate using tax cuts to stimulate the economy.  They have a strong bias against government spending, or at least spending that is used to stimulate the economy (spending for military and wars is usually OK though).

Next we move to views that owe a greater heritage to John Maynard Keynes, though Keynes is far from the only theorist contributing to the views.  We’ll call the next group of policy recommendations Keynesian.  Not surprisingly, this view owes a lot to Keynes.  But Keynesian theory and models have evolved a lot since Keynes’ time.  Some historians of economic thought have argued that, were he alive today, Keynes might not agree with what much of what today’s “Keynesians” argue.  Nonetheless, standard Keynesian models/theories differ from classical/neo-classical/supply-side theories (the ones that conservatives like) in that it focuses on aggregates in the economy like total demand and total spending.  Keynesian models also try to explain why in aggregate, the total economy doesn’t always behave as if it were a simply made of purely rational micro-markets.  Keynesian theory allows for more situations where markets don’t behave rationally all of the time.  Even more significantly, Keynesian theory observes that if we simply assume the economy is the sum of whatever happens in a bunch of micro-markets, we can commit the fallacy of composition.  Keynesian theory points out the cases where the paradox of thrift takes over or when monetary policy is not likely to be effective.

Despite the allegations of many critics, standard Keynesian theory allows for monetary policy to be effective.  But typically standard Keynesian theory says that when the crisis is big or when interest rates are very, very low, then only fiscal policy, increased deficits, will do the job.  Those deficits could be created by either tax cuts or increases in government spending. But, they won’t be equally effective in creating jobs. Basically what’s needed is more spending (demand for goods) in the economy. People need to be motivated to spend more money.  Tax cuts provide money for households and firms to spend, but they do so weakly.  First, people might not spend all the tax cut – they might save some.  Increased savings won’t increase total demand and therefore won’t create the need for new jobs. Further, firms will only spend if they expect future increases in demand.  They won’t spend and invest just because they have more cash in their hands.  Since we have no assurance that a tax cut will result in enough new spending in the economy, Keynesians are more likely to argue for increased government spending because government spending directly creates demand for goods and services.  Contrary to critics’ claims, Keynesian policies are not based upon any ideological desire for socialism or government control.

So what do Keynesian policy proposals for creating more jobs look like?  Increased government spending is the answer.  In particular, while any spending will help, the most desirable forms of spending are public goods, things like infrastructure and schools, and also on social safety nets, things like unemployment compensation, social security, and Medicare. If a proposal calls for more infrastructure spending or extensions/increases in unemployment compensation, it is clearly inspired by theories/models with Keynesian roots.

Finally, there’s proposals that are inspired by the most progressive branches of modern macroeconomics.  Let’s call these proposals the Progressive proposals. Proposals in this area would involve would build upon the ideas of Keynesian group, but go further.  The spending would be greater and on a larger scale. Proposals in this area would call for programs where the government doesn’t just fund projects and buy goods, it actually creates programs that directly hire the unemployed.  Typically such programs are proposed to be temporary or designed in a way to only hire when the private sector won’t (see Bill Mitchell & Randy Wray’s Jobs Guarantee proposals).  These are not socialist or communist proposals.  That’s a whole different thing.  Often Progressive jobs-creation proposals include having the government initiate and fund large-scale infrastructure projects during periods of high unemployment.   This group, which has little popular voice among modern U.S. politicians, is inspired by what’s called Post-Keynesian and Modern Monetary Theories.   In many ways, the original Keynesian proposals for dealing with unemployment are closer to this group than to what we call Keynesian today.  Today’s Keynesians are actually pretty conservative when compared to historical policies.

So there we have it.  Four schools of thought and proposals for how to create jobs in the economy.

Despite the labels attached and misused by politicians, the reality is that the political discussion and policy recommendations of today, the ones with supporters in Congress or the White House, are actually quite conservative.  Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal in the 1930′s was actually rather Progressive.  In the 1950′s, 60′s, and 70′s, the dominant thinking in Washington was Keynesian.  In fact  a”centrist” politically in that era would have still been somewhat Keynesian on our scale above.  In the 1980′s though today, the “center” of mainstream politics has increasingly moved towards conservative thinking.  Today, for example, President Obama is actually pretty conservative.  He is certainly more conservative than the Republican Richard Nixon was in the 1970′s.

Let’s look at the latest proposal from the Obama administration for stimulating the economy to create jobs. It’s actually quite conservative and it’s not very Keynesian at all.  In fact, of the proposed $447 billion effort, less than 1/4 involves more spending for infrastructure or unemployment benefits.  That’s less than 1/4 of the proposal is basic Keynesian.  Instead, it’s overwhelmingly focused on tax cuts and business tax credits/incentives.  These are the policy proposals of a conservative.  Even the original 2009 “stimulus bill” was heavily oriented towards tax cuts and tax incentives.  Despite what critics said, less than half of it was traditional Keynesian stimulus. It’s a sign of how the U.S. political dialogue has shifted towards the conservative/far-conservative end that the Obama proposals have been challenged as “Keynesian” and Obama himself accused of being “socialist”.

* The word “liberal” is particularly problematic. The positions argued by today’s “conservatives” in the U.S. are in fact the positions that were historically identified as “liberal” going back to the 1800′s.  In the 1800′s “liberal” meant anti-government and pro-free market.  Yet, thanks to the power of talk radio and Republican presidential campaigns since the 1980′s, the word liberal has come to be used an epithet to describe opponents of conservatism.  I’ll stick with progressive to label this more left-wing end of the political spectrum to avoid the emotional taint that liberal carries these days.

The Mean and the Median Tell Two Different Stories

Averages, if you’re not careful, can as easily mislead as enlighten.  It matters a lot which statistical measure of the “average-ness” that’s used.  A good example comes in the case of the U.S. long-term trend of economic growth.  What we’re interested in is to what degree the amount of GDP the average household has available has increased over time.  It’s the prime way economists measure whether not living standards are improving.  GDP, of course, is the measure we use to count output in the economy.  GDP is the total market value of all goods and services produced for final demand in a year.   Real GDP is the inflation-adjusted version of it so we can compare GDP from different years.   But of course, just because total GDP, or even real GDP, is going up from year to year is no assurance that living standards are generally increasing.  After all, if real GDP grows by 1% per year but the population grows by 2% per year, there’s less per mouth each year.

So we need to adjust the real GDP measure to account for population growth. We want a measure of average GDP per person or average GDP per household.  Those readers who didn’t fall asleep in statistics class might recall that technically “average” isn’t a statistical measure.  Instead there are several different ways of calculating what statisticians prefer to call “central tendency” instead of “average”.  The two most common calculations in economics are the mean and median.  And there’s a huge difference between them.  The mean is  what you probably learned in primary school as the “average”.  To calculate it we take the total and divide by the number of people in the population.  When economists cite GDP per capita, we are, in fact, calculating the mean Real GDP per person.  The mean, the real GDP per capita for the U.S. over the last 34 years has grown at around a 1.9% annual rate.  That might not sound like much, but remember the power of compounding means that at 1.9%, mean real GDP per person will double in less than 40 years – one working lifetime.  Sounds good, right?  Sounds like the American dream in action, right? Wrong.

Real GDP per capita when looking at the U.S. is highly misleading because most of the growth only goes to the top 1% income folks.  The vast majority of Americans, the other 99% of us, haven’t experienced anything like that growth.  To see the difference let’s consider real income of the median household.  Remember Gross Domestic Income is the same as Gross Domestic Product.  It’s just counted differently by counting income available to spend instead of actual spending.  Long run, they are the same.  Now let’s quick review what the median is. The median is the middle observation. It means that there’s as many observations with a lesser value as there are with a greater value.  In this context it means that there are exactly as many households with a smaller income as there are households with a larger income.  It’s another way of looking at the average.  In this case we’re looking for the most typical household.  Statistics note:  mean will equal median if both sides of the distribution are identical, but in income this isn’t true – millionaires, billionaires, and rich households are a lot richer than the $49,700 median income but the poorest households can only $49,700 poorer at most.

In the U.S. over the last 34 years, the median household income has only grown at less than 0.5% per year despite increases in education.  So real GDP per person grows at 1.9% per year, but real median income only grows less than 0.5% per year.  At 0.5%, it will take 150 years for income to double.  End of the American dream of doing a lot better than your parents. What accounts for the difference?  It’s the upper 1% of the income distribution, the rich folks, millionaires and billionaires, that have skimmed off the 65% of all of the GDP gains for 34 years.

Princeton economics professor Uwe Reinhardt explains in the NYTimes Economix blog:

So if an American macroeconomist — a specialist who tends to think of nations as people — or high-level government officials or politicians mimicking a macroeconomist boasted on a television talk show that “average family income grew by 3 percent during 2002-7, more than in most European economies,” about 99 percent of American viewers, reflecting on their own experience, would probably scratch their heads and wonder, “What is this guy talking about?”

The third chart, below, exhibits the growth path of real G.D.P. per capita in the United States over the period 1975-2009 and the corresponding path of real median household income. The data show that over the 34-year period, real G.D.P. per capita rose by an annual compound rate of 1.9 percent. Those data come from the Economic Report of the President to the Congress (Tables B-2 and B-34).

Sources: Economic Report of the President to Congress (G.D.P.); Census Bureau (income)

According to the Census Bureau data (see Table H-6), however, median household income in the United States rose by less than 0.5 percent a year. Other than national pride in league tables, that 1.9 percent average economic growth does not mean much for the experience of the median household in the United States.

Income Distribution Does Matter. It’s Wrong Now and Stopping Growth.

When people think about “income distribution” there’s a tendency to think of it only in terms of what different people or households have available to spend.  In other words, we focus on the fairness or equity of whether some households should only have a small amount of money to live off of vs. others who get a large amount of money to live off of.  The debates then often deteriorate into whether or not the households put forth effort (“worked”) for their income and therefore “earned” it.

But there’s more to the issue of income distribution.  A household’s income is not just determined by how much “effort” it’s willing to make or how much “investment” it’s made in the past.  So a household’s income isn’t just how much you work and what education/qualifications you have.  The general level of wages matters too.  And that’s determined at the macro level by institutional arrangements in society.

The nature of production is that it requires both capital and labor.  The joint product is then sold.  This is called productivity.  Part of the income distribution question is “how is the value from joint productivity split up between payments to capital and payments to workers”.

In the U.S. during the Golden Era, the period of World War II until the mid-1970′s, the social contract and institutional arrangements were that the benefits of increased productivity were split evenly between both capital and labor.  Both benefitted.  Starting around 1980 that deal was cancelled.  The social contract has increasingly moved to all gains from improved productivity going to capital and none to labor.  As a result, labor’s share of national income has consistently declined.  The Great Recession was a major blow.  It’s this change in the social contract that is the root source of the frustration and pain felt by so many households.

Garth Brazelton at Economics Revival explains why this matters now.  He explains why we are still in a recession, or at least why the 90% or so of us that work for  a living as opposed to living off of interest and profits are still in recession:

Who cares about double-dip. We never left. Why? because you can’t get out of a recession without consumers/labor income growth. While productivity has grown over the last few years, labor’s share of national income continues to plummet. This implies that others (capitalists / profit-makers) are ‘out of their recession’ but consumers and laborers are not.

The BLS has a nice publication here.

Ordinarily a low cyclical labor share isn’t necessarily a problem because firms can use profits to invest in new business ventures a eventually lower the unemployment rate and provide more compensation in a recovery. The problem here of course is that firms are too busy paying off past debts from poor decisions made a decade ago, or two skittish to do anything substantial with their profits at the moment. So that, in combination with the low labor share of income is like a double-whammy for consumers and laborers who see the haves continue to have and the have-nots continuing to have nothing.

It’s the Political Economy That Must Change.

Peter Dorman at Econospeak has an excellent post on the real challenges facing the U.S. today.  It’s the political economy that must change.  It no longer serves the interests of the vast majority of Americans. We need more discussion and action at these levels>

It’s the Political Economy, Stupid!, by Peter Dorman: Sometimes living in the world of ideas makes it harder to understand the real one. If you happen to be an economist, and the time is now, that is true in spades. Take Paul Krugman, for instance. After bemoaning the terrible policy choices of the last two years, he writes, “I’m still trying to make sense of this global intellectual failure.” It’s as if the core problem is that political leaders didn’t learn their macroeconomics well enough.

But Keynes was wrong about the power of “academic scribblers”. Idea-smiths provide language, narratives and tools for those in control, but the broad contours of policy depend on who the controllers happen to be. We are not living through an epoch of intellectual failure, but one in which there is no available mechanism to oust a political-economic elite whose interests have become incompatible with ours.

This is not some sudden development, much less a coup d’etat as is sometimes claimed. No, the accretion of power by the rentiers has been systematic, structural and the outcome of a decades-long process. It is deeply rooted in modern capitalist economies due to the transformation of corporations into tradable, recombinant portfolios of assets, increasing concentration of and returns to ownership, and the failure of regulation to keep pace with technology and transnational scale. Those who sit at the pinnacle of wealth for the most part no longer think about production, nor do they worry very much about who the ultimate consumers will be; they take financial positions and demand policies that will see to it that these positions are profitable.

The rapid and robust global restoration of profits post-2008 was not an accident. Public funds were used to bail out exposed creditors and shore up asset values, while the crisis was used to suppress wages and postpone meaningful regulatory reform. Indeed, I can predict with some confidence that many of the profits, particularly in the financial sector, that have been reported in official filings and blessed by the accounting firms will later be found to be illusory—but not before those who have claims on the revenues have cashed in to their own personal advantage. The institutions will be decimated, but those who owned, lent to or bet on them will be rich. This is not a failure, at least not for them.

You could make a case that, collectively, the interests of the financially endowed ultimately require a rescue of the real, nonfinancial global economy. Surely, when we take our painful plunge into the second dip of the Great Recession, their wealth will be at risk. But the ability to see it at a system level presupposes either a system-level organization of the class or the existence of individual interests that are transparently systemic. Neither appears to be the case today. From what we (you and me) can see from our vantage point, the ruling demands are to make sure my bonds are serviced, my counterparties pony up, the markets I invest in stay liquid, and expenditures for public welfare (i.e. the losers and chiselers) are slashed.

The first principle of political economy is that the scope of democracy depends on the range of views and interests (typically tightly linked) of the owning and controlling class. Genuine public debate and decision-making extends only to those issues on which the elites are divided. In what country today is there a significant division among political-economic elites over core economic questions? How would our situation be different if Obama, Cameron, Merkel, Sarkozy et al. had been on the losing side of their elections?

So, the current mess is not the result of a failure by intellectuals—although clearer, less ideologically-driven thinking by economists would certainly be a good thing and might make a small dent at the margin. As long as there are even a few economists who proclaim the virtues of austerity and deregulation, however, their views will dominate. They haven’t won a battle of ideas; they are simply the ones who have been handed the microphone.

The real problem is political, and it is profound. Unless we can unseat the class that sees the world only through its portfolios, they may well take us all the way down. Unfortunately, no one seems to have a clue how such a revolution can be engineered in a modern, complex, transnational economy.

There were also some excellent comments in the discussion:

PQuincy said…

I’m a historian, and I think the past confirms your assessment of elite behavior and priorities, not only in the last 2 centuries of mass-based polities, but since the rise of large-scale states altogether. Political contention is almost always limited to a narrow range of issues on which those with power disagree, meaning that significant change (and there has been significant change in the political sphere, as well as the economic one) generally results from elite conflicts, not from ‘popular’ pressure. In fairness, elite contention does open gaps for genuinely ‘progressive’ change, and that’s an important lever for intellectuals to remember…but as you say, academics, thinkers, et al. are as a rule never in a position to have more than a marginal effect.

It’s not a promising situation now, structurally: a series of positive feedback loops in the political sphere are actually concentrating the influence of what I am forced to call a “reactionary clique”, at a time when the policies pursued by that clique are, at least on a larger time-frame, seriously destabilizing. But the narcotic effects of power are such that those who drive the dynamics of elite conflict rarely see the larger picture — behave, for all practical purposes. as though they were incapable of seeing the larger picture (call it, if you like, discursive hegemony), and those who believe they see a larger picture are structurally excluded from bringing about changes in response to their perception.

And…

Re-Considering …. said…

Thanks for the very well thought out reasoning in you post.

While you correctly identify the problem and its solution (current “ruling class” and its unseating), you are shy in suggesting how a solution might come about. While I do not advocate violence, history has shown us that fundamentally there are two ways by which subjugated classes improve their position. A traumatic way and less traumatic one.

Revolutions (most egregious examples are the French, Bolshevik, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions), whereby the ruling class, along with its interests, are eliminated by the subjugated classes. A traumatic event indeed, but, in my opinion, not sustainable in the long run unless the entire world adopts those political and economic paradigms.

Less traumatic and, more sustainable in the long term, are the outcomes of strong labor and student movements like the ones that took place in Europe in the 60s and 70s. Those movements made sure to convey to the ruling classes the message that a more equitable wealth distribution and effective social safety net were needed to avoid the extremes and dispossession that a revolution would involve. Reluctantly, the ruling class complied and the social safety nets and income distributions typical of Western Europe emerged.

In the same light, one must interpret the recent unrests in Western European countries (UK, Greece, France) (and most recently in Israel) as a response to the austerity measures taken by conservative governments of these countries to protect rentiers and capitalists. The austerity movement is trying to undo at least some (ideally, all) of the achievements of the 60s and 70s and redistribute wealth away from the “ruled classes”, when it is clearly the “ruling class” that should bear most of the cost of its disastrous, reckless, and self-serving policies. While the current message in Western Europe is still not of the same intensity of the 60s and 70s due to a current better wealth distribution than that of the 60s, the message is similar in content and direction. Its intensity may increase if the rentiers and capitalists will insist with their policies.

So, why the US labor and student movements do not materialize or are active to the same extent of the ones in Europe? The answer is very simple… while in Europe the “ruled classes” realized a long time ago that there will never be cooperation between them and the “ruling class”, in the US people still believe and pursue the American dream, which is fueled by the once in a while admission of few “mortals” on Mount Olympus. Let’s also not forget that constant sense of guilt passed on by the Pilgrims that, somewhat, it is exclusively the individual’s fault if his/her life is not better… and, maybe, the Pilgrims they were right given that US citizens keep electing the same (type of) people over and over to lead them. After all, wouldn’t you rather have a beer with a nice guy from Texas or Hawaii than protesting in some square?

And…

TheTrucker said…

I stand fittingly chastised for my indictment of the economists.

The Tea Party may well have hit upon a method to overcome the current problems. A constitutional convention to propose particular modifications to federal government structure might seem to be the way out. But that is a holdover from the time when people rode a horse to the nation’s capital in order to be seated in the discussion chamber. The problem is best resolved buy an incorruptible on line polling system of direct democracy in which various policies are proposed and tested for consensus. I do not trust the pollsters and I do not feel that they ask the right questions. At present we have the “super committee” approach which goes in the wrong direction totally. This election of Dems or Pugs who then decide what is the best way to maintain their own power has got to go.

I know that the public is easy to fool. The Republicans prove it every day. Yet there is no acceptable substitute for self governance. When we look at the polls we find that taxing the rich is the majority opinion and that social welfare is a high priority. Yet there is no way to act upon this consensus because the rich own the government. That must change, and it cannot change from the top. Surely there must be a peaceful means of revolution.

If a policy and polling system can be created that is impervious to tampering and corruption then it is entirely possible to supplant the current system or to dramatically improve the current system’s performance. I see no other way.