Response to Mike Caulfield Question

Mike Caulfield on Twitter asks a question today:

There’s more to it. It’s a whole thread.  Rather than respond in what would inevitably be a  long thread myself, I’ll just post my reactions & poorly formed thoughts here. Disclaimer: I haven’t read Simons in decade(s) and all economic “facts” I mention here are really stylized facts or trends.  Enter at your own risk.

Mike asks for example:

No. I don’t think so.  The idea of  industrial production –> scarcity of capital & scarcity of markets doesn’t fit.  Rather, I’d characterize the broad swath as surplus of savings amongst elite –> supply of finance for capital –> capital investment –> industrial production –> greater surplus of savings amongst rich elite –> rinse and repeat.  If anything, we suffer in recent decades from a surplus, not scarcity of capital. Indeed there’s been a fair literature about that in recent times.  Somewhere in that cycle, the supply of finance for capital creates a demand for markets (both capital & final production). I don’t see much evidence that there’s been a shortage of markets, though.  Indeed, the supply of markets seems to be rather elastic and responsive to finance capital’s demand for markets.

I agree with Simons observation but I think it helps to understand the mechanism. Scarcity issues are often driven by either physical constraints (real scarcity) or changes in opportunity costs (relative scarcity).  In the information – attention context he’s talking about it’s both real and relative scarcity.  There’s a real, fixed, unchangeable constraint on attention. Attention necessarily requires time (also other inputs such as cognition, etc). Each human is at maximum only capable of 24 hrs of attention per day. Information, all information, requires some degree of time to process (i.e. “pay attention”), ergo, more information bumps up against fixed constraint. Result: increasing real scarcity.

We can also consider the opportunity cost of paying attention to a piece of information.  Notice we use the term “pay attention” – we’re implicitly doing the trade-off.  As more information exists, the value of our attention rises. When I pay 10 minutes of attention to a particular chunk of info in order to gain the benefit of knowing that info, the opportunity cost is the not-knowing-other-stuff.  When there’s more info, that means there’s a lot more other-stuff–to-not-know.  It gets expensive opportunity cost-wise to learn something in particular.

I’m not sure where your’e going with this, Mike, but one econ phenomenon that might be relevant is the entry of married (middle+upper class) women into the workforce in the mid60’s to mid-80’s. In that period, the rise of feminism and feminist attitudes led to a cultural and values change in the middle and upper classes (in U.S.).  Workforce participation among married women rose from 1 in 4 married women working outside the house for pay to 3 of 4.  That was a big shift. It was a huge increase in supply of married women to labor markets.

That in turn led to much larger numbers of employed women. The opportunity costs of time changed a lot. Their time was now worth a lot more since it could be traded for substantial $ in labor market and previously social/cultural constraints prevented that.  At the time, social/cultural constaints on married men cooking meals for their households hadn’t changed yet (that’s been pretty laggy), so the “responsibility” for meal production in households still largely resided with the married women.  A home cooked, largely from scratch dinner now became very, very expensive opportunity cost wise.  Goodbye home-cooked from scratch meatloaf or fried chicken, and hello McDonalds, KFC, or microwaved factory-prepared food.  Ultimately, this translates into a what appears to be a relative scarcity of home-cooked food from fresh ingredients.

Don’t know if I helped. I fear I only muddied things. But then, that’s what I do. I’m an economist.

 

An Economics of Polarization

This post is a response to yesterday’s discussion in Davidson Now’s pop-up MOOC,  “Engagement in a Time of Polarization”.   The key provocation for the discussion was Chris Gilliard’s great essay Power, Polarization, and TechThe video of the hangout discussion is embedded at the end of this post for you.


In his discussion of social media rules and platforms, Chris poses an interesting hypothetical:

If we had social media and rules for operating on platforms made by black women instead of bros, what might these platforms look like? What would the rules be for free speech and who gets protected? How would we experience online “community” differently than we do now? Would polarization be a bug instead of a feature? The historical disenfranchisement of black and brown women and men is compounded by these same folks still being walled off and locked out of tech institutions through hiring policy, toxic masculinity at the companies, and lack of access to venture capital. “Black women are the most educated and entrepreneurial group in the U.S., yet they receive less than 1% of VC (Venture Capital) funding.”

I’m going to argue that if Facebook or Twitter or one of the other monster social media platforms had been staffed and created by black women (or just about any other historically disenfranchised group) the results would likely have been the same.  I’m not arguing an “all people are corrupt” position. Rather, I want to highlight the institutional conditions and economics by which these firms come about.  The institutional framework in the US, combined with some straight forward economics pretty much sets the path. Any group of entrepreneurs would likely end up in the same place, behaving the same way, and producing the same polarizing products/services.

I say this not as a voice of gloom, but rather to highlight that if we want to avoid or dismantle the damaging polarization and surveillance capabilities of these social media mega-platforms, we need to make institutional and legal changes.  And those legal and institutional changes may be in areas you don’t suspect such as antitrust law. First, I want to bring to light two different aspects of the institutional economics of these firms. The first is price discrimination and the second is corporate capital funding structures, especially for start-ups.

The bros that started, coded, and grew these social media platforms such as FB, Twitter, Google, and even Amazon, didn’t set out to polarize the population. Each had an interesting concept to provide people such as search (Google), interpersonal social connection (FB), or quick broadcast chat (Twitter).  But those services required large user bases and people were unlikely to pay for the privilege. So a monetization model was needed. Advertising and/or data sold to advertisers. Most folks know that these platforms with their data enable advertisers to “target” specific higher-probability buyers for their products.  But just increasing the likelihood that a specific ad will result in a sale isn’t the gold.

The gold is in price discrimination. Always has been.  I don’t have time now to fully explain price discrimination, but there’s a Wikipedia entry on it and an Economics Help site entry for it. An individual’s real demand curve for a product is very difficult to ascertain. It’s a hypothetical. It’s how many would you buy at all the possible prices? Looked at from a seller’s viewpoint, it’s what’s the maximum price I can charge and still sell as many as I want?  If the seller knows, he/she can charge prices that capture all the consumer surplus value for themselves instead of sharing the joint benefits of the transaction. 

If an advertiser/seller can gain enough information about a potential buyer’s real demand curve, it’s the route to profit nirvana. But historically it’s been difficult to do price discrimination. For products, there’s that pesky Robinson-Patman antitrust law. Often it’s been done via proxy indicators of group preferences – think Ladies’ Night at the bar or higher prices for business travellers on airlines. Getting the knowledge has been tough.  Big data from social media solves that problem.  That’s why social media data is so valuable and profitable and why FB/Google/Amazon/Twitter chose that route to monetization instead of subscriptions or memberships.

This price discrimination behavior is nothing new and neither are the abuses. It’s what made John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil so profitable and so socially destructive 120 years ago.  The urge to find ways to price discriminate is inherent in corporate market behavior.  The only limits legal.  We used to pass and enforce antitrust laws against such behavior, but that’s been considered bad form ever since the Reagan administration listened to the Chicago boys back in the early ’80’s.

To enable price discrimination practices, the social media monsters had to find more and more data about each and every user.  There’s a direct line between individualized data and monetization.  Now the marketers don’t call it discrimination. They call it differentiation.  They want to know exactly how every person is different from everybody else and find little homogenous groups to put them in.

The purpose was economic & marketing discrimination/differentiation. But once the differences are revealed. Polarization, a side effect, is all about finding differences, not commonalities. Finding commonalities doesn’t make money for marketers.

I don’t think any of the bros that did this at these platforms intended or planned to polarize the nation. It was just an unintended, unconsidered consequence.  Don’t get me wrong. I’m not absolving them of responsibility.  Sometimes unintended consequences could and should have been foreseen. It’s kind of like drunk driving. Very few, if any, people set out to drink and the drive with intent of killing somebody.  It happens because they didn’t think and didn’t foresee the consequences of their actions.

Given the incentives and demands of capital structure, I think any group would likely have gone for the price discrimination-data collection jackpot, especially since there are no legal guard rails against it and they likely would have to as a startup.

Now that gets us to another question. Why did FB/Twitter/Google, et al, find the need to maximize the monetization?  Well, here we can fault them. The reason was greed but again it was unintended, unforeseen consequences.  Their choice of capital structure forced it. They went for too much cash at the IPO’s.

Chris is right. Black women as a group are highly entrepreneurial. But there are maybe 4 motivations for entrepreneurship. Some do small businesses because there’s no other option – that’s a lot of present black women entrepreneurship. Some start businesses just to be left alone (like me 20 yrs ago). Some just want to get stinking rich and leave (Peter Theil, Paul Allen). And some want to get stinking rich, build a huge legacy corporation, and rule the world (Zuckerberg, Bezos).  FB/Google/Twitter et al chose to go the IPO route to become stinking rich.  Google, IIRC, did it twice.  The cash they gathered from those IPO’s did more than fund operations and some growth. It was in excess of their real cash needs. The consequence was they needed continuous high growth rate in both users and profits.  That’s what Wall Street style financial capitalism both rewards and requires. With the high, continuous growth, there’s no stock premium No stock premium = low stock price = founder isn’t really that rich.

My argument is that some other group, black women or POC or whoever, might have done things differently, but only if they had set different goals of not getting rich. Unfortunately, the US corporate funding and legal systems don’t really allow for enterprises that in-between. It’s either struggle for funds as a non-profit or go for continuous profit maximizing high growth.

There’s not really an institutional option for funding “just adequate to provide a utility-like service”.  To get the funding to start, any group effectively commits to the profit max, high growth route.  And that commitment drives the monetization strategy of data collection to seize the gold of price discrimination.

Is it all gloom and doom? No. I don’t think so.  But arguments that simply ask for firms and developers to be more “ethical” or even just more diverse aren’t likely to work in my opinion.  We need to change a lot of the rules of the game.

I do have suggestions for those changes, but this more than enough for tonight.

 

Innumeracy and Generosity – Don’t be deceived by big numbers

Just a quick note here.  Lots of people today, especially the media, are making a big deal out of Jeff Bezos and his wife’s donation of $33 million for a scholarship fund for DACA Dreamers. For example there’s this CNN article.  Lots of tweets. It’s a nice gesture. It’s definitely a worthy cause – although worthy causes are legion.

My problem is with the intimation that this is somehow a noble sacrifice. The problem here is common in economics data. We get lost in big numbers and get fooled.  $33 million sounds like a lot. To over 99.9% of Americans, it’s a number we can’t really fathom. It sounds like so much money.  Let’s take a closer look. Bezos household net worth – the value of his personally owned assets minus their debt – is estimated at $105 billon (Bloomberg) or $104 billion (Forbes) (source: Google on Jan 13, 2018 ).  That’s billion with a B. Bezos is 54 years old.

The median household net worth for Americans in his age bracket was $100,404 according to the most recent data for 2013/2014 from Census Survey of Income.  The median means there are as many households with more assets as there are with less assets. It’s the middle observation. It’s typical.

So Bezos has pretty close to a million-times larger net worth than the typical household for somebody of his age. He and his wife sacrificed $33 million of their assets to make this donation. On a strict linear scale, that’s the equivalent of the typical household for his age bracket donating $33.  Yep, that’s all. $33.

Bezos’ sacrifice is the equivalent of an ordinary, typical 54-year old giving $33. Actually, it’s less of a sacrifice. Economics teaches us about diminishing marginal utility of income or money. Basically, when you’re rich each additional dollar of income or asset is much less valuable to you than if you’re poor. To a poor person, the $33 means eating or healthcare. When you’re really rich, it’s just another digit you’ll round-off on your financial statement.

I laud the Bezos family for making a donation. It’s a good thing to do. But let’s not make it out to be more noble than it is.  The bottom 20% of households in that age bracket have zero or negative net worth. The single mother with no assets that stuffs a twenty in the Salvation Army bucket at Christmas makes a lot bigger personal sacrifice.

Micro, Macro, and the Minimum Wage

Meme showing man in office with coffee mug looking skeptical saying "Yeah, I'm going to have to go ahead and disagree with you there."Economists disagree. It’s so common that there are jokes about.  For example,

If all of the economists in the world were laid end-to-end they would scarcely reach a conclusion.

and

Economics is the only field in which two people can get a Nobel Prize for saying the opposite thing.

Why?  I can’t explain all of economists’ disagreements here (I don’t have enough pixels!), but I can explain some of the disagreement over questions of raising the minimum wage.  There are numerous calls for Congress to raise the minimum wage, yet Congress has remained bitterly divided on the issue. Their disagree to a large extend reflects the disagreement among economists. To non-economists, the disagreement seems to either indicate that there really isn’t any science in economics and it’s all opinion, or that some economists must be lying or deliberating obfuscating.  In truth, though, there’s another reason for the apparent disagreement: the difference between micro and macro level economic analyses.

First, let’s establish some historical perspective on the debate. I want to clarify the difference between “normative” and “positive”.  Positive arguments are statements or conclusions about what the predicted effects of a proposal will be without taking a stand on whether those effects are desirable or tolerable. (note that the word “positive” here denotes “factual or likely”, not “good”) Normative arguments are when someone argues whether a proposal should be done. Normative arguments typically are based upon a combination of predicted outcomes and a value judgement as to whether those outcomes are desirable or tolerable compared to the alternative.  For a long time in economics, economists were actually largely in agreement on the positive science, or the predicted effects, of a rise in the minimum wage.  It was generally agreed that raising the minimum wage would give larger incomes to those who continued to work at minimum wage (i.e. low skilled) jobs but that the rise would decrease the numbers of those jobs and thus raise unemployment rates among those seeking low-skilled jobs. Historically the disagreement over minimum wage hikes was over the normative aspects: was the rise in unemployment and loss of jobs worth the increased incomes to others.

The agreement over the predicted positive effects wasn’t always unanimous. There have always been some dissenters. But in the early 1990’s Card and Krueger studied a “natural experiment” by comparing fast food restaurants on two sides of a state line when one state raised the minimum wage and the other didn’t. Their results started a fierce debate that still rages over the predicted effects of rises in minimum wages.  On one side there are now many economists who side with Card & Krueger in saying that raising the minimum wage, even if raised very significantly such as to $15 per hour from less than $8, will not decrease employment and will have a very large increase incomes. On the other side, maintaining the older stance are those such as Don Boudreaux who doggedly argue that any rise in minimum wage must increase unemployment significantly.  Like most topics in economics the practicality of measuring and analyzing the empirical data is somewhat equivocal.  Although there have been numerous studies since Card and Krueger that have buttressed their results, the empirical data along always leaves enough room for some argument.  So what does the theory say?

Don Boudreaux and others of the “increases in minimum wage MUST increase unemployment” camp, would have use believe that theory is unequivocal. The essence of their argument is that low skilled labor is a commodity sold in a market. It has a demand (firms want to buy it) and a supply (low skill workers want to sell it and get paid).  The wage that gets paid is the price of this labor commodity. The most basic supply-and-demand analysis tells us that if the government forces the price up somewhat artificially by setting a price floor (i.e. a minimum wage) below which transactions cannot occur, then there will a smaller quantity of hours of labor demanded. In other words, firms will hire and pay fewer workers. There’s often an appeal to the concept that if the price (cost) of an input or resource goes up, then the firm’s profits will go down and the firm will be less inclined to produce that good or service and therefore will buy less (hire fewer workers).

How can good theory-toting economists dispute this?  Isn’t it supply-and-demand, the most basic micro economic concept as taught in the first few chapters of any principles of econ text?  It’s easy actually. The key is that this supply-and-demand theory as argued against a rise in minimum wage has three major flaws. Two flaws are the result of the theory as applied being too simple (there’s more chapters in the micro text!) and the other  flaw reflects the difference between micro and macro in economics.

The first flaw in the simple supply-and-demand model application to minimum wage type jobs is that there’s really very little evidence that labor markets behave like commodity markets or that they conform to the assumptions necessary to use a supply-and-demand model.  Most jobs, including minimum wage jobs, are more like long-lasting relationships. They aren’t commodity, transaction based like a market for selling widgets or apples or even theatre tickets.  There are dramatic transaction costs involved. Put another way, it’s expensive to hire people (and to fire them and then replace them). Minimum wage jobs aren’t homogenous (they aren’t all the same) the way the theory requires.  Further, the wage paid affects the productivity of the worker, which in turn affects the value of that worker’s output to the firm. When the wage is boosted, workers work harder, stay longer on the job, quit less often, and gradually acquire more productivity and skills. Firms often find that when forced to pay the higher wage, the firm’s total costs, including hiring costs, etc, stays level or even declines.  This is the essence of Arindajit Dube’s studies.

The second flaw is in focusing on the cost of the worker’s wages as if it were the sole consideration in the firm’s decision of how much to produce. The standard theory of the firm and production, which is covered in-depth just a few chapters later in the same economics textbooks after the supply-and-demand model makes it clear:  a firm will produce whatever quantity makes it the most profit. The primary constraints on the output are the demand for the end product, the pricing of the end product, and the core technology used. In other words, if the firm can still sell the output to consumers, it will produce it and the technology (means of production) will require it to hire the necessary labor. A rise in the price of a particular input does not necessarily mean a drop in the quantity produced.

The other two flaws in the arguments against minimum wage increases require shifting to a macro perspective. Micro economics is often described as studying individuals and individual products/markets.  That’s only partially true. Actually micro is a methodology. It’s more properly called “comparative statics using partial equilibrium analysis”.  Micro theories and models explicitly focus on only one particular shifting variable (the wage in this case) and it assumes that all other variables or influences are held constant or unchanged. (Economists call this the ceteris paribus assumption).  In contrast, macro theories are often described as focusing on large aggregate phenomena such gross national product or the inflation rate or the national unemployment rate.  But again, there’s actually a methodological difference. Macro theories require a general systems approach accounting for multiple effects and ripples of many variables that are interrelated.  Let’s look at minimum wage increases as an example of these differences in methodology between macro and micro.

In micro, there’s really only the price (i.e. the wage itself), the quantity of jobs offered, and the quantity of workers available, all of it in the low skill arena.  That’s it. So the micro analysis sees that when the minimum wage is boosted, the firm pays more per worker and each employed worker gets more. End of story.  The only micro question is how it all affects the quantities of jobs.

Macro, however, recognizes that nothing happens in isolation in the economy. There’s a circular flow. Workers are also simultaneously customers. So when the minimum wage goes up, yes, the workers get paid more and firm pays out more money. But what do those workers do with the additional money income? They buy things. Who do they buy them from? Firms that sell and produce products. So the firms not only pay out more money to workers, the firms also get to collect more money by selling more to the increased consumer demand.  But, you say, Acme’s newly enriched minimum wage workers don’t buy that much stuff from Acme. Doesn’t matter. The workers spend it somewhere. And that firm uses the additional money and additional demand to buy more inputs and pay more profits. And those firms and workers then experience income increases and so on and so on as the money circulates throughout the economy. Eventually even Acme sees an increase in sales and revenue collected which in turn helps pay for the wage boosts.  Macro looks at the whole system.

In recent years, many cities and some states have taken it on themselves to raise the minimum wage, often to a so-called “living wage”.  The empirical results have pretty clearly supported the macro analysis. Rises in minimum wages tend to not depress employment and actually tend to stimulate the local economy.  This is the macro analysis.

Sometimes economists just disagree and sometimes they let their ideological and political biases color their professional arguments. Some of that happens in the debates on minimum wage increases.  However, much of apparent disagreement arises from the choice of whether to view the issue through a micro lens or a macro lens.

To read more about the economic analysis of minimum wage increases see these earlier posts:

 

 

There’s No “Skills Shortage”

There are plenty of reasons why higher education in the US needs to change. There are plenty of good reasons why community colleges in particular deserve greater investment. But the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) gets it wrong when they claim

There is a skills gap in our country, causing employers to have unfilled positions and too
many Americans unable to find family wage supporting jobs.

Wrong. Wrong. Wrong.  This is a zombie economic idea.  It’s enormously disappointing when leaders in higher education can’t even get the basic economic thinking straight.  First, let’s just apply some basic economic thinking to it.  Although there are good heterodox reasons for not thinking of the labor market is not an ordinary market (i.e. it’s institutional, not transaction-based), but let’s roll with the idea since so many purveyors of the “skills shortage” myth act like it is.  The implication is that there are multiple “job markets” and that many, perhaps, most are suffering a “shortage”.

So what’s a “job market”.  A simple definition would identify the nexus of potential workers and potential employers in a specific geographic region in a particular occupation.  For example, “welders in metro Chicago” or “CNC machine operators in SE Michigan” or “software developers in Houston” would be examples. Now if there’s a “shortage” in one of these job markets, it means there are fewer sellers (smaller quantity offered, to be technical) and more buyers demanding a larger quantity at the going market price.  Now what happens in both theory and practice when a market has a persistent shortage? Anybody? Yes, the price rises.  Price goes up to attract more sellers and discourage buyers.  And the price keeps going up until equilibrium between quantity offered for sale and quantity demanded become equal and eliminate the shortage. If there were shortages in job markets we should see wages going up!  We should see companies tripping over themselves to offer more and better benefits.  But we don’t see that do we? Wages are stagnant across the board.  That’s because there really isn’t any widespread “skills shortage”.

What we have is business owners and managers reporting a shortage of highly skilled workers who would be willing to work for below-equilibrium and falling wages.  Remember as a nation we’ve drastically cut back on public funding of education and over the last generation  companies have drastically cut their spending on training and apprenticeships.  Those businesses now expect a free-ride from others.  They want workers to pay for their own education and training without paying the wages needed to make that human capital investment worthwhile.  If there were truly a skills shortage, not only would we see rising wages but we’d also see rising college enrolments as the rising market wage encouraged students to invest.  But we don’t see either rising wages or rising enrolments.  In fact for the last couple (few?) years, enrolments have been declining.

I’m not the only one pointing out how bad this zombie “skills shortage” myth is.  Paul Krugman pointed out recently:

    …this new EPI report is a useful reminder of the extent to which another doctrine that sounds serious retains a grip on discourse — namely, the notion that we have big problems because our work force lacks essential skills.

This is very much a zombie doctrine — that is, a doctrine that should be dead by now, having been repeatedly refuted by evidence, but just keeps on shambling along. EPI presents some very interesting evidence from a survey of manufacturing, but they’re hardly the first to show that the data don’t at all support the skills-shortage hypothesis.

But it’s not just Paul Krugman and progressives saying that the “skills shortage” idea is bunk, its leading conservative economists too, like Ed Lazear in this 2012 paper.   Even the Boston Consulting Group, who we might expect to take push the “skills shortage” idea since business owners like to push the idea, seems constrained to follow the data and their data show that:

So what accounts for the high and lingering unemployment?  The Economic Policy Institute looked at the whole issue and surveyed the literature and research in this January EPI report.

There is a sizeable literature on whether a skills mismatch is a driver of today’s weak jobs recovery, and the strong consensus is that the weak labor market recovery is not due to skills mismatch (or any other structural factors). Instead, it is due to weakness in aggregate demand.

That’s it.  We have a shortage of aggregate demand. We have a shortage of customers who spend. We have a shortage of spending. We don’t have a shortage of skills.

Higher education leaders who position their plans based on the false premise of a skills shortage do themselves and their institutions a dis-service, so we may have a shortage of higher education leaders willing to do their own critical thinking and rely on research instead of parroting politically popular zombie ideas. I can understand the temptation of many higher education leaders to use push the idea because they think it will help them get funding. But that’s a losing strategy. By embracing such zombie ideas, they destroy their own credibility with the faculty, the very people they need to implement the changes they’re advocating.

Healthcare Comes to America – The ACA Is Working

Last night was the cutoff for signing up for health insurance on the new Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) healthcare exchanges.  Despite a very rocky start and despite an incredible blitz of lies and propaganda against it by opponents, the program has met its first year target. Charles Gaba at ACASignups tracks the numbers so we don’t have to:

…in spite of everything–the terrible website launch of HC.gov and some of the state sites; the still-terrible status of some of the state sites even now; the actively-hostile opposition and obstructive actions in certain states, the negative spin on every development by some in the news media–in spite of all of this, over 7 million people nationwide enrolled in private, ACA-compliant healthcare plans between 12:01am on 10/1/13 and 11:59pm on 3/31/14…slightly surpassing the original CBO projection for that period.

Of course, the deadline isn’t that final depending on where you live and whether you already started an application or you fall into other special categories.  Again, Gaba tells us:

the enrollment “extension period”, which is 15 days in most states, but which actually runs until April 30th in Oregon (without any “started by 3/31” requirement that I can see) and even all the way out until May 30th in Nevada (with the “3/31 start” requirement). Only 3 states (CT, RI and WA) aren’t offering any extension period at all, and I’m not entirely sure about Rhode Island as their press release was a bit confusing. I also have no idea know what the status of Hawaii’s exchange is.

Of course the 2nd open enrollment period kicks off again this November, but there’s also the other types of enrollments which haven’t ended, even for the current year.

  • Medicaid has no cut-off date; if you qualify, you can enroll at any time.
  • The SHOP exchanges (small business) don’t have a cut-off date. Most of them still aren’t functional (only about 70,000 people are covered by SHOP policies so far nationally), but some are, and they’re year-round.
  • If you’re one of the 5.2 million Native Americans living within the U.S., there’s no cut-off for you either.
  • Finally, for the rest of us, you can still enroll in an exchange-based QHP if you have a major life event such as getting divorced, giving birth, losing your job and so on.

This is a very good start for the country and for the economy.  My own preference, documented elsewhere, was and still is for a single-payer system similar to Canada’s.  But this is significant start.

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